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Preface

I became interested in the refugee crisis not after hearing about it for the first time, but
after making my own associations between Syrian refugees and Islamophobia. Since the election
of Donald Trump to the Presidential seat, my political gaze became sharply attuned to racism,
and I began to closely follow immigration issues both through media coverage and through
statistics on government websites listing the number of green cards being distributed, or the
number of refugees permitted into the United States per fiscal year. In my observation, I started
to notice small injustices, such as the rate of distribution of green cards by country: even before
the Trump presidency, the vast majority of visas were distributed to European countries, which,
by my own conviction, were not the nations of greatest need. I noticed the severe bias towards
Latin American immigrants that reflected in our immigration policies towards the southern
border of the United States, versus the northern.
These interests deepened with President Trump’s comments about Islam in particular.
During his campaign in 2015, his comments ranged from seriously considering “closing down
mosques” to seeing “thousands and thousands of people were cheering” watching the twin
towers fall on 9/11 from Jersey City. After taking several Women’s and Gender Studies courses
that served to broaden my perspective of racism, internal biases, and systematic discrimination, I
understood much more deeply how a certain biased narrative, such as the Islamophobic
comments that Trump said publicly, can become representative of a group. I was fixated with
how refugees, specifically from Syria, grew to become a symbol of danger in the United States,
and how the American populace came to view them as a danger to public safety, despite their
forced flight from their homeland due to a brutal civil war. Recognizing the intersection of
racism and Islamophobia in these negative attitudes, I became concerned with the identity that
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this discourse had created for refugees, in addition to migrants from Latin America, who have
long been greeted with discrimination upon their arrival in the United States.
I began working for the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Elizabeth, N.J. in June
of 2018 where I worked directly with newly-arrived refugee families, finding them affordable
housing options, work, schools for their children, and free English programs. My duties often
extended to handling paperwork and translating for the caseworkers on site. Clients would
frequently arrive in our office having come straight from the airport, with no plans for where
they were going to stay that night. Most of the new arrivals spoke no English, and many of them
had lost family members, including their children, to the conflicts they had fled. I learned most
importantly the urgency of refugee flight. In my experience our clients were not overjoyed to be
in the United States, nor were they looking forward to the struggle of building a life from scratch
with the little resources they had brought with them in an entirely different culture with a hostile
community of citizens. Their flight was in every way a last resort, and a worst-case scenario. All
of the clients with whom I was able to interact were the ones who were lucky enough to have
received asylum status from the State Department. National IRC offices do not handle cases of
non-registered migrants, and this political status remained a mystery to me throughout my work
with the organization.
Coming out of my summer with the IRC, I knew I wanted to dedicate my research to the
people who remain undefined in their statelessness. The clients who arrived in my office were all
properly documented, probably as a result of sheer luck, or a loophole in written law. The
thousands of others, however, who are left on the borders of nation-states, have no opportunity to
gain nationality in a host country, and many will end up in refugee camps. Throughout my thesis,
I will explore the socio-political attitudes and structures that allow these people to remain
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stateless, and the forces that work collaboratively to prevent their achievement of citizenship or
permanent residence in host countries.

5

Introduction

Perhaps the story that most gripped the world in late 2015 was that of Aylan Kurdi, the 3
year-old Syrian boy whose lifeless body washed ashore after his family attempted to cross the
Mediterranean Sea from Turkey to the Greek Island of Kos. In order to avoid Turkish authorities,
the rubber inflatable boat that Aylan boarded along with his mother, father, and brother left
Turkey at 5 a.m. under the cover of darkness. Since the start of 2015, thousands of migrants had
traveled in overcrowded inflatable rafts unfit for ocean crossings in attempts to evade the strict
security that occupies land borders, specifically the border between Turkey and Greece.
Thousands died in the two weeks surrounding Kurdi’s death, including his mother and 5 year-old
brother, but it was his image that penetrated Western news outlets and captured the attention of
American and European readers alike. Regardless of why it was that Kurdi’s death enraptured
the world as opposed to statistics detailing the numerical quantities of loss, according to NPR the
crisis gained major media attention following the release of his photo, mobilizing international
support and a record number of donations. 1
According to the Washington Post, even though in the year 2000 rates of displaced
peoples dropped to a historic low since the beginning of the 20th century, by 2005, rates were
climbing again, reaching an all-time high in the year 2015, with 60 million displaced people
living all around the world outside of their countries of origin. This enormous number, markedly
higher than the 40 million displaced persons in Europe during and immediately after World War
II, is a reflection of the vast reach of internal conflict in countries with the highest output of
people fleeing political unrest, such as Syria with 569,774, South Sudan with 283,400, Sudan

1

Cole, Diane. “Study: What Was The Impact Of The Iconic Photo Of The Syrian Boy?,” National Public Radio, last
modified January 13, 2017, https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/01/13/509650251/study-what-was-theimpact-of-the-iconic-photo-of-the-syrian-boy.
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with 906,585, the Democratic Republic of the Congo with 537,074, and Lebanon with 1,468,137,
all as of 2017. 2 The global impact of the refugee crisis of the 21st century is massive, and has
caused shifts in national policies, the formation of thousands of refugee camps across the world,
and a growing tension among Western countries that seek to protect their national resources and
citizens from the outpour of populations seeking refuge from conflict.

Motives for flight: why refugees leave

Perhaps the most addressed country of the refugee crisis of the 21st century is Syria, what
was once a middle-Eastern farming nation that remained self-sufficient as a result of its export of
oil. The enormous quantity of refugees originating from Syria could not have been expected
from the conditions of the country at the start of the unrest that occurred at the beginning of the
Arab Spring, in 2011. The country’s rocky political history can serve as a telling indication of
why this unrest rose to the surface during the Spring. Following a long dictatorship beginning in
1971 that he had inherited from his father, Bashar al-Assad followed in his father’s footsteps
when he began limiting investment opportunities to a select urban elite beginning in the year
2000, causing uneven economic development and frustration among the working class. 3 In
response to uprisings against these injustices, Assad’s regime implemented, “widespread arrests,
interrogations and torture, paid informants, secret police and the use of live ammunition to kill

2

“Refugee population by country or territory of asylum,” The World Bank, accessed January 23, 2019,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sm.pop.refg.
3
Rochelle Davis, Great Decisions (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 2015), 66,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/44214795?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents .
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and dissuade protestors in the streets.” 4 Mistreatment of protestors by the government triggered
the first wave of refugees to begin trickling across the national border into neighboring countries,
namely Turkey and Jordan. The rebel forces, who held control of some small areas, were
disorganized as a result of having very little funding, and this poor management led to robberies
and lootings, pushing more Syrians out of their homes. 5 Three more major waves of refugee
flight would follow this small initial amount, in the spring of 2012, the winter of 2013, and 2014,
the third and fourth confirming the crisis as noteworthy, as thousands of refugees were crossing
the Syrian border as of the beginning of 2013. 6 As rebel forces gained control of more
municipalities, social services were lacking, and public institutions such as hospitals and schools
were either failing or under attack. 7
By 2013, small villages as well as major cities were under siege, as the government
struggled to regain control of territories overtaken by rebel forces. By 2014, jihadist groups, such
as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS) were also capitalizing on the chaotic scramble for
territory, and their willingness to use violence to increase their influence allowed them
significant gains within the year. 8 Rochelle Davis claims in Great Decisions that, “In Iraq and
Syria, the rise of ISIS, which eliminates opposition through mass and well-publicized executions
and harsh repression, has resulted in a steady flow of refugees fleeing areas where the group has

4

Rochelle Davis, Great Decisions (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 2015), 66,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/44214795?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents .
5
Rochelle Davis, Great Decisions (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 2015), 67,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/44214795?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents .
6
Rochelle Davis, Great Decisions (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 2015), 68-70,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/44214795?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents .
7
Rochelle Davis, Great Decisions (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 2015), 69,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/44214795?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents .
8
Rochelle Davis, Great Decisions (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 2015), 70,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/44214795?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents .
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taken or is likely to take control.” 9 The extremes of violence used by ISIS against citizens of
Syria indicated to many that flight was the only reliable option, as infrastructure was crumbling
around them. Many Syrian refugees determined that an eventual return to Syria, which had been
the hope for many that had left earlier on, was no longer possible, as the violence did not appear
to be slowing.
The crisis, however, began in such small numbers that host countries that had initially
welcomed Syrians with open arms were not prepared for the massive migrations of millions that
eventually took place with the rise of jihadist groups and rebel attacks. Elizabeth Ferris and
Kemal Kirisci claim in The Consequences of Chaos: Syria’s Humanitarian Crisis and the
Failure to Protect that while the number of refugees after one full year following the
disturbances in Syria remained at 26,000, the number climbed astronomically after four full
years to 4.6 million, taking host governments completely by surprise and leaving them reluctant
to provide resources to the foreigners at their borders. Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, the three
countries that had received 90 percent of refugees fleeing Syria, were not expecting the further
news that in the meantime, it was too dangerous for many of these refugees to return to Syria,
and they may never return. 10 When the crisis began and the flow of refugees was light, it was
thought that the regime in Damascus would soon fall, and the migrants could return quickly. The
governmental response that had originally been welcoming now turned to hostility, as the cost of
maintaining refugees grew. Both Turkey and Jordan sought international assistance for their

9

Rochelle Davis, Great Decisions (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 2015), 70,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/44214795?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents .
10
Elizabeth Ferris and Kemal Kirisci. The Consequences of Chaos: Syria’s Humanitarian Crisis and the Failure to
Protect (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 36,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1c2cqws.7?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents .
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efforts, Turkey claiming to create a “safe haven” for Syrian refugees as a result. 11 Eventually,
Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan became hostile, politically and socially, towards Syrians, as the
refugee population slowly pushed the governmental capacities of these countries over the edge.
In Turkey, public opinion of Syrians became drastically negative. Ferris and Kirisci
claim,

“The sight of Syrians begging in the streets is causing particular resentment among local people, especially
cities in western Turkey. There have also been local reports of occasional violence between refugees and
locals. In turn, this reinforces a growing public perception that associates Syrian refugees with criminality.
A public opinion poll conducted in Turkey in October 2014 revealed that more than 62 percent of those
surveyed supported the idea that Syrian refugees were implicated in criminality and were responsible for
the uptick in the number of crimes committed. As early as 2013, a poll in Lebanon found that 52 percent of
respondents believed Syrian refugees posed a threat to national security and stability, and more than 90
percent said the Syrian conflict had a negative impact on the Lebanese government’s capacity to protect
Lebanese citizens.” 12

Public opinion of Syrians, in this respect, worsened dramatically as the number of refugees
entering host countries continued to increase. Ironically, Ferris and Kirisci state, “these attitudes
represent a stark contrast with local authorities’ and security officials’ observations in all three
countries: in reality, criminality is surprisingly low, and Syrian community leaders are very

11

Elizabeth Ferris and Kemal Kirisci. The Consequences of Chaos: Syria’s Humanitarian Crisis and the Failure to
Protect (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 38,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1c2cqws.7?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents .
12
Elizabeth Ferris and Kemal Kirisci. The Consequences of Chaos: Syria’s Humanitarian Crisis and the Failure to
Protect (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 40-41,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1c2cqws.7?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents .
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effective in preventing crime and defusing tensions between refugees and locals.” 13 A large
factor in the management of large numbers of refugees living in a host country is the distribution
of resources between refugees and existing citizens. Angered by the redirection of their country’s
resources towards foreign residents, citizens of Turkey became even more resentful of Syrians.
Ferris and Kirisci assert,

“In the case of Turkey, this is heightened by the fact that the government continues to allocate funds from
its own budget to pay for dealing with the refugees. This practice hits a particular nerve among the locals,
who feel that it undermines their own access to, for instance, health services, while health personnel are
occupied to an overwhelming degree with the refugees. Not surprisingly, 71 percent of the Turkish public
told pollsters that Syrian refugees have cost the economy dearly, and 60 percent objected to their taxes
being spent on the refugees.” 14

Syrians who arrived in Turkey in the later years of the crisis, however, usually arrived hastily,
and were in immediate need of financial support as a result of their hurried arrival to escape
violence. The Turkish government’s capacity to support both their adoptive residents and their
citizens is limited, as the flow of Syrian refugees across Turkish borders continues today.
Discussion of the Syrian crisis is important as it is this mass migration that has dominated
media representations of the refugee crisis. Of all the crises of the 21st century, Syria’s holds the
most significance to the United States and the Western world, as the influence of ISIS extends
beyond Syria’s borders and into the lives of people living in the United States and European
13

Elizabeth Ferris and Kemal Kirisci. The Consequences of Chaos: Syria’s Humanitarian Crisis and the Failure to
Protect (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 41,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1c2cqws.7?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents .
14
Elizabeth Ferris and Kemal Kirisci. The Consequences of Chaos: Syria’s Humanitarian Crisis and the Failure to
Protect (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 41,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1c2cqws.7?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents .
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countries. To talk about refugees without mentioning Syria would be short sighted. The crisis
that evolved in Syria, however, is not unique. Many conflicts that produce large quantities of
refugees have similar roots and similar disputes, leading residents of those areas to flee for
similar reasons. The refugee crisis in South Sudan began in 2011, when the country declared
independence from Sudan. Since the separation, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement has
dealt with internal conflict over the victory, and provoked governmental unrest that has led to
widespread violence throughout the new nation’s territory. The vast majority of refugees, at 82%
according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), are women and
children, most of whom are survivors of famine and violent outbreaks. 15 More devastating to the
civilians of the country are the effects of working people turning away from their livelihoods to
participate in war efforts, leaving thousands of civilians to starvation. Without a sufficient
harvest to support the population, many were forced to flee for reasons similar to Syrians: the
inability not only to live peacefully, but to live at all. The number of South Sudanese refugees
has now surpassed 2 million. 16 Though crises occur throughout various regions, for various
reasons, conflicts of human origin (as opposed to those of nonhuman origin like natural
disasters) usually transpire as a result of desperation, where refugees often face a question of life
or death for themselves or their children when considering the risk of flight.

15

“South Sudan Refugee Crisis,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, accessed January 25, 2019,
https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/south-sudan/.
16
“South Sudan Refugee Crisis,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, accessed January 25, 2019,
https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/south-sudan/.
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European opinion and the refugee crisis

The European continent is no stranger to large influxes of migration, as the wave of
refugees that fell upon Europe during and immediately following World War II was one of the
largest in all of human history. However, European attitudes towards refugees have scarcely
changed since the introduction of laws protecting refugee rights following World War II, namely
at the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees. Perhaps the most progressive
international legislation regarding forced migration of its time, the Convention determined and
signed into international law several agreements between member states, which were to be
monitored and upheld by the UNHCR. The Convention defined the refugee as “a person outside
their country 'owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.'” 17 Christina Boswell
claims in “European values and the asylum crisis” that the Convention determined, on what she
calls a “liberalist universalist” platform, that refugees have inalienable rights on the basis of their
individual rights. One of the key determinations of the Convention was the “non-refoulement”
clause, which determined that refugees could not, under the contract of the Convention, be
expelled or sent back (refouled) to their country of origin if their life or liberty would be put at
risk. There were many suspicions on the part of the UNHCR that Turkey has violated these
provisions of refoulement in response to the Syrian refugee crisis.
Though the Convention instituted a certain set of rights for refugees specifically,
European civilian attitudes towards refugees have not always reflected the legislation governing
these migrants. Significant economic, social, and political conflicts have surrounded the giant

17

Christina Boswell, “European values and the asylum crisis”, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International
Affairs 1944-) 76, No. 3, (2000), 539, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2625953?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.
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waves of migration in recent years, as the legislative developments of the Convention are no
longer regarded as functional in the modern-day crisis by many citizens of the European Union.
Boswell claims that many European nationals believe, “The individual rights-based model is
unable to cope with current levels of influx, and its generous provisions impose an excessive
financial and social burden on receiving countries.” 18 There are two main arguments among
European nationals to restrict immigration policies towards refugees that persist today according
to Boswell. The first is,

“a liberal welfare-based argument that is primarily concerned with defending the socio-economic benefits
of nationals in liberal democracies. This type of welfare-based claim is used to justify restrictions on access
to welfare benefits or employment rights for asylum-seekers, or on access to asylum systems themselves, in
order to protect the social and economic interests of current citizens. Second, there is what I shall call an
ethnocentric argument for restricting influx, based on claims about the significance of racial, cultural or
ethnic characteristics. This second type of argument tends to underlie discriminatory measures to deter
specific groups of asylum-seekers or immigrants: tighter visa controls on countries with non-white
populations, or preferential immigration schemes for Europeans. In practice, both sets of justification for
restriction are often combined in a single nationalist approach.”

Essentially, according to European nationals across many nations, refugees pose a significant
burden both economically and culturally. Furthermore, the Pew Research Center has found that
overwhelming majorities of EU populations believe that the EU is doing a poor job in handling
the refugee crisis. The Center claims,

18

Christina Boswell, “European values and the asylum crisis”, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International
Affairs 1944-) 76, No. 3, (2000), 543, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2625953?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.
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“Regardless of whether they see refugees as a threat, or whether they think they increase terrorism, crime or
take jobs, Europeans overwhelmingly believe that the European Union is doing a poor job of handling the
refugee crisis. Majorities in every country surveyed say they disapprove of how the EU is handling
refugees, including a staggering 94% of Greeks and 88% of Swedes.” 19

This data about the EU’s handling of the refugee crisis supports Boswell’s arguments about the
failure of traditional European ideologies of individual rights surrounding the refugee crisis. It is
also an indication of a greater issue among European nationals: the majority negative attitude
towards refugees themselves, that extends beyond just the policies.
Among the Pew Research Center’s data are statistics on the associations European
nationals make between refugees, specifically those originating from Syria, and violence. The
Center explains,
“Many Europeans are concerned that the influx of refugees will increase the likelihood of terrorism and
impose a burden on their countries. A median of 59% across 10 EU countries voice concern about the
prospect of increased terrorism. This includes 76% who say this in Hungary and 71% in Poland. Around
six-in-ten in Germany (61%), the Netherlands (61%) and Italy (60%) also think refugees will increase
terrorism in their country. (The survey was conducted prior to terrorist attacks in France and Germany that
occurred over the summer.) Additionally, many Europeans believe refugees are a burden to society because
they take jobs and social benefits that would otherwise be available to citizens of each nation. Overall, a
median of 50% across the 10 countries surveyed says this. Only in Sweden and Germany do majorities say
the opposite – that refugees make their country stronger because of their hard work and talents.” 20

19

Jacob Poushter, “European opinions of the refugee crisis in 5 charts,” Pew Research Center, last modified
September 16, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/16/european-opinions-of-the-refugee-crisis-in5-charts/.
20
Jacob Poushter, “European opinions of the refugee crisis in 5 charts,” Pew Research Center, last modified
September 16, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/16/european-opinions-of-the-refugee-crisis-in5-charts/.
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A wider contributing factor to this perceived threat are European ideas about the strengths of
diversity. The Center’s statistics show that the average European does not generally believe that
diversity makes their country a better place to live. The Center claims,

“In no EU country surveyed did more than four-in-ten say that having an increasing number of people from
many different races, ethnic groups and nationalities makes their country a better place to live. And in two
nations, Greece and Italy, more than half said that increasing diversity makes the country a worse place to
live.” 21

These surprising statistics show a general lack of acceptance that nations have towards diversity,
and they raise many questions regarding the potential for the integration of refugees into national
communities.
Throughout my thesis, I will address many related questions regarding the fluctuating
relationships between national communities and outsiders, specifically in the case of refugees
and stateless peoples. After discussing the meanings of these terms, such as the definition and
identities of the refugee and the nation-state, I will delve into a philosophical examination of
individual rights, particularly rights that are defended by nation-states, and the relationships
between national communities and those existing outside of those communities whose lives may
depend on their acceptance into a nation-state. I philosophically outline the likely experiences of
refugees as they are faced with statelessness, including what forces push against them, what
actions taken by what groups have collaborated to ensure their inability to gain rights, and what

21

Jacob Poushter, “European opinions of the refugee crisis in 5 charts,” Pew Research Center, last modified
September 16, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/16/european-opinions-of-the-refugee-crisis-in5-charts/.
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attitudes contribute to these actions. My aim throughout this thesis is to understand and analyze
the philosophical concepts of statelessness, exclusion, and rights.
I begin my argument by determining what a refugee is, who occupies that identity, and
how that identity relates to the opposing force in the refugee crisis, which is the nation-state. In
this opening chapter I introduce the term “stateless refugee” to identify the subjects of my
primary argument running throughout my thesis, as these individuals occupy the intersection of
stateless peoples and refugees: while not all stateless people are refugees, not all refugees remain
stateless. I examine those who are refugees from their nations of origin, as well as those who
remain stateless, living outside of the theoretical borders of any nation. I look to philosopher
Thomas Nail to examine the concept of the “migrant,” and the effects that migration has on
national communities. I also examine the concept of the nation-state, and offer my own working
definition of the term.
In the following chapter, I analyze Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s The Social Contract, which
proposes theories of the Rights of Man and the liberties man exercises under the State. Rousseau
argues that there are certain inalienable liberties that can be attributed to every man 22, so long as
he exists and participates in the governmental functioning of the state. These rights are natural, in
that each man is born with them on the condition of his birth alone. However, Rousseau gives no
indication as to how these rights are preserved. Next, I discuss Hannah Arendt’s Origins of
Totalitarianism, in which I orient her argument towards the opposition of Rousseau’s claims.
Arendt argues that fundamentally stateless peoples are rightless, regardless of the philosophical
assertion that all men 23 have natural-born rights. The reality of the situation, Arendt argues in the
text, is that rights must be defended by an institution more powerful than man himself, and that
22
23

Rousseau argues on behalf of all men specifically, not all people.
Arendt also uses specifically gendered language in her arguments referring to men.
17

in the modern world, the nation-state occupies that role. Conceptually, it would be meaningless
to claim that all men have natural-born rights when there are people living today that have no
such opportunity, as a result of their statelessness. Throughout the chapter, I discuss the
relevance of Arendt’s argument for the philosophical determination of the defense of rights, and
ultimately conclude that it is absolutely imperative that a nation-state, with juridical power over
its own territory, stand in defense of individual rights. This, in turn, leaves stateless refugees
rightless, and ultimately defenseless in their attempts to regain a nationality.
In light of my discussions of Rousseau and Arendt, I then shift to exploring the
oppressive side of the refugee crisis: the exclusive national community within the nation-state,
and the attitudes held by these communities that lead to the oppression of stateless refugees and
other migrants. I open this section with a discussion of the formation of national communities.
Throughout the chapter, I offer examples of exclusive national communities, and examine how
exactly these groups form. Ultimately, there are connections within these national communities
that unite populations, such as cultural, racial, ethnic, political or religious commonalities that
stateless refugees cannot penetrate as foreigners that do not share in the ties that bind.
Transitioning from the formation of national communities to the attitudes that these communities
hold, I subsequently examine Simone de Beauvoir’s The Ethics of Ambiguity, in which she
argues for the philosophical implications of what she calls the “serious man.” De Beauvoir’s
“serious man” is he who mistakes his own worldview for the universal perspective of the order
of things. The serious man makes projections about the world according to his individual
position, and fails to recognize or validate the viewpoints of others as a result. Unable to give
way to the convictions of others, the serious man sacrifices their freedoms, alongside his own, as
he mistakes the subject for the object.

18

I also turn to Edward Said’s Orientalism to further illuminate de Beauvoir’s conceptions
of the serious man. Said asserts that the Western Orientalist projects a predestined idealization of
the “Oriental” unto Eastern peoples. With the help of the broader Western societies, these ideals
become reinforced continuously through the perpetuation of romanticized conceptions of the
“Oriental,” without ever truly incorporating Eastern peoples into this narrative of their existence.
Throughout Orientalism, Said introduces the concepts of the “Self and the Other,” in which the
Self, often an individual or institution in a position of power, fabricates an identity for the Other,
creating distance between that Other and the Self. This binary plays into the rejection of stateless
refugees from national communities, because bonds between members of a national community
often serve as means of differentiation of those members from foreigners, or Others.
Connecting Said’s discussion of Orientalism with de Beauvoir’s serious man, I identify
the attitudes of nation-states towards stateless refugees, and the ignoring of the rights of stateless
refugees that nation-states often practice in their refusal to grant nationality to this group. I argue
that nation-states adopt the oppressive attitudes of the Orientalist and the serious man, as many
enforce strict immigration policies that prevent stateless peoples from entering their territories
without any consideration for their inability exercise rights in the absence of the protection of a
state with juridical power. My discussion of de Beauvoir and Said returns us to Arendt’s
arguments surrounding the need for the nation-state’s political capacity in the defense of human
rights, especially relating to legal statuses and nationality. Ultimately, the concept of the Self and
the Other that Said introduces in Orientalism serves as a major explanation for the exclusion of
stateless refugees from these communities and states.
I use the following chapter to link my examinations of Said and de Beauvoir to those of
Arendt and Thomas Nail, whose concept of the “migrant” was discussed in Chapter 1. Nail
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argues that the social progress that migrants allow for societies to achieve is necessary for the
forward movement of civilizations. He claims that without the unrecognized work that is
achieved by jobs occupied primarily by migrant workers, like maintenance jobs, our societies
would be essentially unusable. However, there still remains a societal conception of “stasis,”
meaning that often, majority groups within national communities are unable to recognize this
work as valuable, or are unable to see the significant contributions that this work offers to
societies. This attitude creates what Nail calls a social illusion of stasis, in which real
contributions made to civilizations by migrants is seen as lack, or as nothingness. Nail’s
argument leads me to examine the question of usefulness, in relation to the role of stateless
refugees in societies and national communities. In examining Nail’s conception of social stasis, I
compare the attitudes of de Beauvoir’s serious man to Nail’s work. De Beauvoir claims that the
serious man sees the world in terms of usefulness, in alignment with his restrictive worldview.
The example de Beauvoir provides is of a colonial administrator who is building a highway: the
value of “native” peoples is assigned by the colonial administrator, in a position of power over
“native” peoples, by their usefulness in building highways. The “native” individual who does not
have skills in construction is thus not valuable, and it does not matter if invaluable people die in
the process of building. Even those with building skills are only attributed value in this specific
context, and remain useful only so long as they maintain their strength and ability to build. The
ignorance of the serious man can be understood further by overlaying the concept of the Self and
the Other, where the serious man represents the Self creating an identity for the Other in order to
distance himself from that. Unable to recognize the worldviews of Others as valid, the serious
man projects his own convictions unto the order of things, convinced that his subjectivity is the
world’s object. This type of disregard erases the original identities of the Others in a way that
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benefits the serious man, or the Self. Stateless refugees, in this sense, are the victim of attitudes
like that of the serious man which are adopted by national communities and nation-states, in
which their usefulness and their identities are assigned to them, and without rights to contest
these assertions, they are left defenseless and unable to live peacefully.
Ultimately, I aim to challenge the existing narrative of statelessness, such as the one I
believe relates to de Beauvoir’s conceptions of the serious man. I believe that philosophical
understandings of statelessness may provide insight into why national communities and nationstates act in the ways that they do that so greatly disenfranchise stateless refugees who live
without rights or nationalities as a result of the immigration policies of nation-states. The nature
of philosophy is to seek understanding, and I believe in the capacity of reshaping philosophical
arguments about stateless refugees to spread true and just ideas regarding their identities and
rights.
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Section A

In this section, I discuss the definitional meanings of stateless refugees, who will serve as the
subjects of my thesis, as well as nation-states. I make a point to define these terms separately, as
my arguments focus specifically on a certain category of refugees and stateless peoples, and seek
to determine the roles of nation-states in the repression of stateless refugees. Thus, in the
evaluation of the rights of stateless refugees and the rights of nation-states in the face of mass
migrations, I will evaluate the two categories separately.
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Chapter 1: Defining the stateless refugee

Migrants: distinguishing between those who move

Throughout this chapter, I will distinguish between the many forms of motion across
boundaries that encompass the idea of migration. While my thesis is principally an analysis of
stateless people, I view stateless people as a smaller category of a broader idea of migratory
people. In The Figure of the Migrant, Thomas Nail broadens the conceptual understanding of
migration, emphasizing the expansive abstraction of movement as it relates to the identification
of the migrant. Nail claims, “the figure of the migrant is not a ‘type of person’ or fixed identity
but a mobile social position or spectrum that people move into and out of under certain social
conditions of mobility.” 24 The defining characteristic of the migrant, Nail claims, is motion,
which appears in The Figure of the Migrant in two distinct forms: the spatio-temporal traversion
from a place of departure to a place of arrival, and the condition under which societal change is
driven. Nail elaborates that the more encompassing definition of the migrant is the latter, as it
addresses the true extent to which migrants hold an influence over the progression of societies,
keeping them from remaining in stasis. In regards to the second form of motion, Nail asserts,

“The movement of the migrant is not simply from A to B but is the constitutive condition for the qualitative
transformation of society as a whole. The migrant not only undergoes an extensive movement but also
affects an intensive or qualitative social movement of the whole of society itself. In this sense, the figure of
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the migrant is a socially constitutive power. It is the subjective figure that allows society to move and
change.” 25

The work of migrants, Nail claims, often goes unnoticed, but is critical to the maintenance and
continuous reconstruction of society. Everything from jobs related to the maintenance of spaces,
cleaning, construction, etc., are disproportionately occupied by migrants: jobs which are
underpaid considering cities would be virtually dysfunctional without them. The image of stasis,
in the context of migrant work, is related to the “capitalist division between productive and
reproductive labor,” 26 signifying that while it may seem as though maintenance-related labor is
not inherently progressive, it is essential for the forward movement of a society.
The importance of Nail’s interpretation of the role of the migrant is found within his
understanding of progression. He claims that the constant flow of progress within the borders of
a nation is reliant on the changing social tides brought in waves of migration. In other words,
with a constant influx of an evolving labor force, social change is accelerated. However, the
critical aspect of this perceived “stasis” in relation to the role of the migrant is the fact that the
social progress offered by the arrival of the migrant is ordinarily ignored. On the occasion that a
social group enacts real progress that is perceived as stasis, that social group’s significance and
value is diminished greatly. As Nail explains, when the credit for societal progress is taken away
from the migrant and attributed elsewhere, the presence of this enormous social movement is
perceived as motionless, and thus reaches a state of dispensability.
Applying Nail’s broad conception of the migrant towards understanding stateless
peoples, I will interpret the “migrant” through a number of different lenses. First, I will define
25
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the “migrant” as the comprehensive category of people who traverse across the boundaries of
provinces or nation-states for any wide variety of reasons. Second, I acknowledge migrants
collectively as a catalyst for social change, serving to progress societies towards productive
movement forward. Third, I will treat the term “migrant” as an overarching category under
which stateless people and refugees fall as subcategories. Finally, the term migrant encompasses
the aspects of the identities of stateless peoples and refugees that include their movement across
state boundaries, their experiences as non-nationals wherever they may land, and the drive that
they provide that initiates social change.

Refugees and stateless peoples

As subcategories of the “migrant,” the refugee and the stateless person drive social
change insofar as they move across borders. I will use the terms “refugees” and “stateless
persons” to address the subjects of my thesis, though the two terms distinctly represent two
groupings of identities and experiences. These people are categorized by their very characteristic
of un-belonging. It is their rejection from communities on all sides of them, their undesirability
as determined by surrounding nation-states, that drives my interest in their inability to access
rights. Though I will address the rightlessness of stateless people when outside of the jurisdiction
of a state in Chapter 3, here I will discuss stateless people and some refugees insofar as they lack
the protection of rights within a nation-state.
In terms of their categorical identification as stateless people or as refugees, these two
groupings often overlap. Some refugees are stateless, but not all, while some stateless persons
are refugees, but not all. Statelessness can be defined in very simple terms, and I will use the
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term statelessness to define an individual’s lack of a documented nationality. 27 Statelessness can
occur as a consequence of many different socio-political uncertainties, including ambiguous
nationality laws. Laws of nationality are often divided between jus soli, which refers to the right
to nationality due to one’s birth within the territory of that country (the policy by which the
United States extends citizenship rights), or jus sanguinis, denoting one’s right to nationality
based on blood relation to one’s biological parents. 28 If an individual is born to foreign parents
from a country that does not offer nationality by means of jus sanguinis, in a country that does
not offer rights to nationality by means of jus soli, that person would have no national ties, and
remain stateless. In this sense, not all stateless people experience leaving their countries of origin
due to a forceful and compelling reason, such as civil unrest, prevailing famine, or governmental
persecution.
Similarly, not all refugees are stateless. Many refugees are displaced within their own
states of origin, either migrating to different cities or moving in and out of camps set up to house
the displaced. Alternately, certain refugees are allowed entry into host countries for a variety of
reasons, usually after being legally approved for a special visa. In an American context, refugees
are considered to be of “special humanitarian concern to the United States,” 29 meaning
distinctive visas are issued to those who fall under the United States’ definition of a refugee. The
definition adopted by the United States appears in the Refugee Act of 1980, which was a revision
of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. The definition of a refugee was found to be
distinct from that of other immigrants in the Act of 1980; it was thus conceptually separated
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through the creation of a new act, meant to address the increasingly widespread global issue of
the flight of refugees from their homes. In light of decision to escape that many are compelled to
risk because they are powerless in the face of persecution, the definition that appears in the
Refugee Act of 1980 is as follows:

“The term ‘refugee’ means any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided,
and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 30

In terms of distinguishing a refugee from other categories of immigrants, the special nature of
persecution is the focal point of discussion. The inclusion of this definition as relating
specifically to the persecution that an individual may experience implies that persecution is a
critical aspect of one’s categorization as a refugee.
Matthew Gibney contests this definition in the essay, “The Ethics of Refugees,” arguing
that persecution, while a well-founded reason to receive asylum or refugee status in a host state,
is not the only well-founded reason. Gibney argues,

“From an ethical point of view, a major concern with the UN definition lies in the arbitrariness of using
‘persecution’ an essential criterion for refugeehood. Why should one distinguish between someone whose
life or liberty is endangered because they have been specifically targeted for bad treatment and someone
who, while equally endangered, is escaping the indiscriminate violence of civil war? If, as seems plausible,
30
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the reason we want a category of people called “refugee” is to identify individuals with a need for the
protection of a new state, the inappropriateness of this distinction seems obvious. One should no more
distribute asylum on the basis of why someone is endangered than one should allocate access to hospital
beds according to the how an individual came to be injured.” 31

The definition, that continues to be used as governmental policy of the United States is
undeniably a contributing factor to the low intake of refugees per year. The number of refugees
admitted into the U.S. throughout the years of Barack Obama’s administration held steady at
110,000. However, under the administration of President Donald Trump, that number was
lowered significantly to 45,000. Though the numbers stand to represent the maximum capacity
for refugee intake, the standards for obtaining refugee status in the United States are founded on
the principle that demonstrated persecution must be provided upon application. Thus, the
application process is extremely competitive and creates what feminist writer Audre Lorde
would call a “hierarchy of oppression,” in that one form of expulsion from one’s homeland is
interpreted as more pressing and more legitimate than another. 32 Notably, Lorde argues that there
is no hierarchy of oppression, as one form of oppression just as real, just as debilitating as
another. The only result that can arise from the comparison of oppressions to one another, Lorde
claims, is the undermining of an oppression perceived to be less severe.
The definition upon which Gibney ultimately settles is that of David Miller’s Strangers in
Our Midst. Gibney claims, “the key question is whether an individual has to cross into another
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state in order to have his or her human rights protected. Refugees, [Miller] suggests, are
individuals ‘whose human rights cannot be protected except by moving across a border, whether
the reason is state persecution, state incapacity, or prolonged natural disasters.’” 33 This definition
of the refugee turns the issue on its head: rather than focusing on one’s reason for expulsion or
compelled migration, which creates an unnecessary hierarchy and turns the responsibility of
acceptance on the individual, Miller’s definition holds nation-states accountable for the
protection of human rights. In the following section, I will look to Hannah Arendt’s Origins of
Totalitarianism to explain the necessity of an organized state in the protection of human rights.
Throughout my thesis, I will use Miller’s definition as referenced in Gibney to define the term
“refugee.”
Though refugees and stateless peoples hold separate categorical identities, the focus of
my thesis extends to individuals who occupy a third category, in which these two classes of
identity intersect. While some refugees are stateless and some stateless people are not refugees, I
hope to address the particular struggle of individuals with whom both of these identities resonate.
Throughout my thesis, I will therefore use the term “stateless refugees” to refer to this particular
grouping, which is the exact overlap between people who identify as both stateless and as
refugees.
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The nation-state

In order to demonstrate the existence of national identities, we must examine the concept
of the nation-state. To begin, nations are made up by a grouping of people, who collectively
occupy a national identity, while states are territories governed by a sovereignty. Typically, that
sovereignty can be attributed to the nation. National identities thus differ when crossing an
international border. While borders act as physical boundaries to a state, in many cases they also
act as cultural, political, economic, and social boundaries as well. In this section, I will focus on
the national groupings that exist within nation-states, that heavily influence the decisions and
policies that are enforced by the state. I seek to determine what it is that binds these groupings of
individuals together to form these national identities. I will additionally determine the
relationship between the people within a nation and the state in which they live. Therefore, in
order to address both the physical and societal denial of access that stateless refugees experience,
I will refer to these groups as combined “nation-states” throughout my thesis.
The formation of the nation is built from a common understanding of national identity,
which is shared among brethren forming a sense of unwritten unity. Samuel Scheffler discusses
in the essay, “Immigration and the Significance of Culture,” that immigrants are often thought to
be a disturbance to this sense of unity:
“A country’s unity is both expressed in and sustained by its citizens’ shared sense of history; by their
mutual recognition of national holidays, symbols, myths, and ceremonies; by their allegiance to a common
set of values; and by their participation in a range of informal customs and tendencies covering virtually
every aspect of life, including modes of dress, habits of thought, styles of music, humor, and entertainment,
patterns of work and leisure, attitudes toward sex and sexuality, and tastes in food and drink. Immigration
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transforms these sources of cultural unity into grounds of contention and conflict. Immigrants arrive with
their own histories and traditions, customs and values, habits and ceremonies. The features and practices
that define the host nation’s distinctive identity--the very features that give its nonimmigrant citizens the
sense of belonging to a single people--are experienced by immigrants as unfamiliar at best, and alienating
or oppressive at worst.” 34

The unity created by this sense of commonality, Scheffler explains, is what preserves the will in
the people to continue to coexist in harmony. The immigrant, representing a breach to this
harmony in every cultural and at times, ethnic way, can be considered a threat to the stability of
the nation.
In order to govern these encountered differences, the state must either decidedly allow or
forbid the entry of immigrants within its borders. Just as there are rights that can be attributed to
individuals, there are also sets of rights that may be ascribed to states. In the essay, “The Ethics
of Immigration: Self-Determination and the Right to Exclude,” Sarah Fine discusses the broad
topic of state rights within the field of immigration ethics. She claims,

“The subject includes, but is not limited to, questions related to forced migration, particularly the nature
and extent of duties towards refugees, as well as the very definition of a refugee… ...what states owe to
those immigrants they admit, especially in terms of access to citizenship and its accompanying rights, as
well as the ethics of guest-worker programmes... ...what, if anything, states owe to those would-be
immigrants they refuse to admit… ...and what, if anything, they owe to those who are present without
authorisation... ...whether states may exclude would-be immigrants according to any selection criteria…
...whether states have special responsibilities to particular would-be immigrants, such as those from their
former colonies, or to family members of their citizens and residents, or to long-term undocumented
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migrants, and⁄or to prospective immigrants from poor countries… …[and] what, if anything, states may
demand of immigrants once they have been admitted.” 35

Fine references the work of Michael Walzer, who declares, “Admission and exclusion are at the
core of communal independence.” 36 She mentions the idea of self-determination as a right of the
people in the interest of setting, “the terms of their common lives,” 37 as well as the state’s right
to exclude as critical to self-determination. The idea of a collective nationality ties into the idea
of self-determination and exclusion; the creation of a national identity is reliant on common
attributes or aspects of lifestyle. National identities can be grouped by any number of categories,
such as race, religion, ethnicity, tradition, tribal identity, and others. Therefore, as national
identities are categorized, methods of exclusion become rather simple: when an individual fails
to meet the specified category of identity, they become an alien to what has collectively been
recognized as the standard of membership. Fine claims,
“Liberal nationalists maintain that one of the legitimate roles of the modern (nation) state is to protect its
distinctive national culture. The national culture (‘a set of overlapping cultural characteristics—beliefs,
practices, sensibilities’) is important for its members’ sense of their collective identity and belonging, as
well as providing them ‘with a background against which more individual choices about how to live can be
made.’” 38

Such a claim made by liberal nationalists raises a question: is the collective “people,” or nation,
of a state distinct from the state itself? To claim that a state reserves the right to self35
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determination and exclusion, referring to the state as a territorial body, is to claim that a state has
the right to determine who is permitted to occupy what space. This notion becomes even more
complex when it is taken into account that often, states hold sovereignty over one nation, but
sometimes, multiple nations occupy one state. In that sense, some members of a certain nation
may be forbidden from occupying specified territories, while others are able to move freely
throughout. The question is then raised whether territorial occupation should be segregated by
national identity. Ideally, territorial occupation would be even distributed by population size and
regardless of socio-economic class, but ultimately it is the state’s responsibility to legally
determine who should occupy what space.
The distinction between a nation, comprised of “the people,” and the state brings me to a
foundational text for my thesis, Hannah Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism. Arendt addresses
the issue of nationhood in relation to the state and stateless peoples, arguing that without
membership within the jurisdiction of a state, an individual’s rights are not properly protected.
She claims that a collective national identity based on common attributes or aspects of lifestyle
are often a reason behind exclusion of others. In the context of exception laws under the League
of Nations for minority groups in Europe following World War II that allowed migrants to live
within nation states, Arendt claims that “the minority” became a permanent institution that
would, from that point in time onward, require addressing from nations within the League. Once
these nation-states realized the extent of their responsibilities towards refugees and stateless
peoples, “the transformation of the state from an instrument of the law into an instrument of the
nation had been completed; the nation had conquered the state.” 39 In this sense, the nation holds
primary control, as a result of the importance of shared national interests, over how the state
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presides over its people, and the people existing directly outside its physical and metaphysical
borders. Though the state does not always bear the burden of obeying the people’s demands, the
will of the people certainly has a heavy influence on the decisions the state makes in relation to
their interests. 40
Arendt claims that the conquering of the nation by the state, and the dissolution of the
“rule of law,” occurred, “at precisely the moment when the right to national self-determination
was recognized for all of Europe, and when its essential conviction, the supremacy of the will of
the nation over all legal and ‘abstract’ institutions, was universally accepted.” 41 In this sense, the
rise of populism, in the context of the citizen as opposed to the foreigner, arose as a result of the
right of self-determination for the nation-state. Arendt will also claim that any natural-born rights
held by stateless refugees, that are championed by many philosophers, cannot practically be
upheld unless that individual exists within a nation-state willing to protect it.
Another issue raised by the division of the nation from the state is the question of whether
nations have the right to occupy certain territory under the control of a state. In the essay,
“Territorial Rights and Exclusion,” Lea Ypi examines the ties that bind certain nations to the
territory which allows them to function as a nation-state. Ypi explains that any agent, whether
that be a family, state, company or individual, can have control over a territory, but there remains
a question of who should be entitled to exercise those territorial rights. Territorial rights, Ypi
claims, involve three distinct elements:
“The first is what we might call a right to jurisdiction, i.e. the entitlement to make and enforce rules over a
bounded geographical area. The second should be understood as a right to control, use, exchange, or
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transfer natural resources available in the territory. Finally, the third involves a right to control the
movement of people across the borders of the territory and to exclude others from entering it.” 42

Ypi subsequently introduces the argument of acquisition theorists, who believe that the universe,
“initially belongs to humankind in common, and agents’ subsequent way of intervening over
resources (by making efficient use of them, working on them, deserving the benefits they
produce etc.) justifies their establishment of property claims.” 43 A state’s right to selfdetermination, if the right to territory is based on one’s efficient use of its resources, extends to
the members of that governing body’s right to provide for the residents of their nation. In terms
of Arendt’s claims about the rightlessness of stateless people without the protection of a nationstate, the practical right of a nation to exclude would override that of a refugee seeking to occupy
territory within a state.
However, in response to these issues surrounding the legitimacy of rights upheld by
nation-states, Fine considers a philosophical argument raised to oppose the rights of states and of
individual migrants and refugees. Fine claims,
“[a] challenge faced by each attempt to defend the state’s right to exclude (as with any defence of a right) is
to indicate why the state’s interests in exclusion outweigh the claims of would-be immigrants to be
admitted to the territory and⁄or membership, such that it can be said to have a general right to exclude. Each
of the arguments about self-determination that I have outlined go some way to showing why the state’s
control over immigration is usually important to the state and its members, but we also know that would-be
immigrants typically have significant interests in being admitted. The conventional move here is to argue
that the state’s⁄citizens’ claims to exclude would-be immigrants are weakest and even may be defeated
where the would-be immigrants in question have the strongest claims to be admitted, as in the case of those
42
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fleeing for their lives and seeking sanctuary. And so if the state has a general right to exclude, either that
right does not extend to excluding refugees, for example, or at times may be defeated by the competing
rights of refugees.” 44

I will adopt Fine’s point that ethically, the right of a refugee to live in safety, insulated from
persecution, civil war, political unrest, or natural disasters that may cause them harm or death
supersedes the right of the nation-state to exclude individuals based on reasons of nonconformity
to a national identity, or economic concerns regarding overuse of a state’s resources. In some
cases, the exclusion of a stateless refugee from a nation matters less than one’s exclusion from
the state, as safety exists primarily within the borders of a host country, and secondarily within
the national community. Despite any territorial control a nation-state may have over an area of
land, their right to exclude people from the use of resources from that land is exceeded by the
compelling need of a stateless refugee to occupy that land.
When considering that stateless refugees are without protected rights when they are
removed, and subsequently forcefully excluded, from the jurisdiction of a nation-state, their
collective prohibition from nation-states becomes pressing. Throughout my thesis, I will use
Arendt’s analysis of the ways in which the nation-state functions to exclude minority groups to
address how this exclusivity of national communities within nation-states contributes to the
continued repression of stateless refugees. I will also further address Nail’s argument regarding
the social movement catalyzed by the movement of migrants across borders in order to defend
my conclusion about the worldview through which we should think about stateless refugees. In
the case of stateless refugees and their movement in and out of nation-states, I will also discuss
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the social and political change that is driven both from their movement, and from their lack of
movement.
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Section B
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Chapter 2: Conceptualizing natural-born rights

Throughout this chapter, I will examine Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s The Social Contract, a
prominent 18th-century Enlightenment-era proclamation of rights, in order to raise questions
about the liberties of stateless peoples. I challenge the ways in which all people are afforded
rights in his theory, including the participating citizens of nation-states. In the analysis of the
liberties of people belonging to a collective social body that Rousseau calls “the people,” I draw
attention to the exclusion of stateless people from those liberties. I argue that Rousseau’s
definition of individual rights in tandem with the State is inadequate: in arguing that liberties can
be achieved only under the assurance of equality on the part of the State, Rousseau’s argument
fails to address statelessness. Rousseau discusses the liberties afforded to all people both
naturally upon birth, and within the confines of an organized society. In this chapter, I will
primarily address Rousseau’s conception of the achievement of liberty within a nation-state, and
will address the concept of natural-born liberty in the following chapter.

The presumption of natural-born liberty

In The Social Contract, Jean-Jacques Rousseau examines the relationship between
individual liberty and the functioning of the “State” as a collective group of individuals. In the
well-known first line of the text, Rousseau outlines both the natural-born rights of all men and
the limitations of liberty that man faces when existing within the confines of a state: “Man is
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born free; and everywhere he is in chains.” 45 There, Rousseau introduces the philosophical
decree of natural-born rights, which I will follow Rousseau and define as the right to protected
liberties and involvement in a collective state of inalienable equality on the basis of one’s mere
existence, or, more specifically, existence and active presence within the State. The State, in the
manner that Rousseau addresses it, is the governing body in which all men, alongside their
liberties, are entitled to participate.
In his examination of liberty, Rousseau introduces the dynamics of liberty within the
family in Chapter II of Book I, “The First Societies,” in which he identifies the family as the first
structure in which one’s liberty is in question. Arguing that the family structure is the “first
model of political societies,” Rousseau identifies that early in life, children are alienated from
their liberties, due to their inability to self-preserve, or to care for themselves. Once a man
reaches the age of competency, or the age at which he becomes able to self-preserve, he must
“become his own master.” 46 Nonetheless, each child, solely because of their birth as men, are
entitled to the same rights and liberties as their fathers: “Even if each man could alienate himself,
he could not alienate his children: they are born men and free; their liberty belongs to them, and
no one but they has the right to dispose of it.” 47 The only factor, then, in the maintenance of
one’s liberty is one’s personhood. Rousseau claims that the decision to either alienate one’s
liberty in the interest of self-preservation, or to relinquish one’s liberty to another, is always that
of an individual. One person’s liberty does not extend to the infringement of another’s. In this
sense, liberty is the essence of one’s condition: one must always enact one’s liberty in the form
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of self-preservation, and only alienate one’s liberty under the condition that one is not able to
self-preserve.
The difficulty is how to maintain one’s liberty while living within the limits of a society
that requires sometimes yielding to the needs of others. Rousseau addresses this difficulty by
claiming at its core the clauses of the social contract can be reduced to one sentence: “the total
alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community for, in the first
place, as each gives himself absolutely, the conditions are the same for all; and, this being so, no
one has any interest in making them burdensome to others.” 48 Only within a society of absolute
equality can liberty be exercised to its fullest extent: “Finally, each man, in giving himself to all,
gives himself to nobody; and as there is no associate over whom he does not acquire the same
right as he yields others over himself, he gains an equivalent for everything he loses, and an
increase of force for the preservation of what he has.” 49 The exact balance between existing in a
society and still exercising one’s liberty, Rousseau proposes, is in a republic in which everything
that is lost is gained back through societal returns; these may range from the protection of rights
to private property, social benefits, a justice system, and a myriad of other resources a
government may provide for its people. When each individual contributes a necessity to a
society’s prosperity, no more and no less than other individuals, the collective obtains this return.
In Rousseau’s reasoning, the natural-given presumption of liberty is afforded to every
man, on the sole condition that he exists. Even if someone chooses to alienate their own liberty,
that choice is undeniably their own, and one person’s liberty cannot extend to the infringement of
another’s. The gift of liberty, however, as a right that all men are born to actualize in the context

48

Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (Open Library, 2018), Ivi,
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bucknell/reader.action?docID=5605470.
49
Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (Open Library, 2018), Ivi,
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bucknell/reader.action?docID=5605470.

41

of a collective society, is an assumption about the accessibility of society to all men. 50 The mere
nature of a stateless refugee, which I have defined as the overlap between refugees and stateless
people, arises in opposition to Rousseau’s conception of liberty. Rousseau’s argument highlights
both one’s liberty when independent from a state, in addition to ways that one’s liberty may be
actualized within a state. In the following chapter, I will problematize Rousseau’s assertion of
natural-born liberties existing independently of a state. However, Rousseau’s central argument
emphasizes the achievement of liberty within a civilized state, as living freely outside of an
organized society is now unattainable. Since the birth of neighboring nation-states, it is now
impossible to resort back to one’s original state of living according to human nature alone, and
thus Rousseau proposes methods of achieving liberty within an ordered society. Only those who
participate in a nation-state, such as citizens or anyone eligible to vote, can fulfill their destined
liberty in the form of contribution to their government. Stateless peoples may have previously
been unable to fulfill their liberty due to differing governmental styles than the republic that
Rousseau describes, 51 or civil unrest in their home countries. After fleeing their respective
nations of origin, they are unable to exercise these natural-born liberties to their fullest extent, as
they are unable to access nation-states due to immigration restrictions. Thus, the significance of
natural-born liberties for all becomes contradictory when applied to the scenario of stateless
peoples who are unable to exercise these supposed rights.
Furthermore, Rousseau’s assertion of natural-born rights for all men relies on the
universality of their distribution among people. Rousseau asserts that one’s ability to exercise
their liberties is contingent on the guarantee of equality for all under the sovereignty of the state,
50
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based the foundational belief that all men are entitled to rights solely on the basis of their
personhood. If only certain people, such as those belonging to nation-states, are afforded equality
at the hands of the state, the conceptual conviction of natural-born rights disappears, as
Rousseau’s abstraction of equality is no longer upheld. Within Rousseau’s given argument, in
order to exercise one’s liberty (within a nation-state) to its fullest extent, the state must guarantee
equality for all participants. 52 When the state’s sovereignty is only able to extend equality to
those recognized as citizens, the concept of natural-born rights for all becomes null. Ultimately,
Rousseau attempts to apply the philosophical concept of universal natural-born rights to a world
now occupied by nation-states, and fails to address the complications that arise as a result of the
exclusivity of their borders.

“The people” as an exclusive collective

Rousseau refers to this collective as “the People.” The participation of the people in their
government goes as follows: “Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the
supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as
an indivisible part of the whole.” 53 The collective formed by the people, thus, is entirely reliant
on universal participation. Each member’s offering is critical to the overall functioning of the
state, as well as the maintenance of liberty for every individual. Individuals, thus, are undeniably
equal in the provision of returns by the state, in exchange for the participation they offer.
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The equality between all individuals presented by Rousseau creates an image of
collectivity, or a collaborative group identity between all participants in a people. In giving and
receiving to the state, each individual serves an equal role in an expansive force, and thus is
emancipated in its sheer allied power. Rousseau, in referencing the formation of societies,
mentions that in a state, “the people” hold power: “A people, says Grotius, can give itself to a
king. Then, according to Grotius, a people is a people before it gives itself. The gift is itself a
civil act, and implies public deliberation. It would be better, before examining the act by which a
people gives itself to a king, to examine that by which it has become a people; for this act, being
necessarily prior to the other, is the true foundation of society.” 54 Later, Rousseau explains the
significance of “the people,” as a governmental force: “At once, in place of the individual
personality of each contracting party, this act of association creates a moral and collective body,
composed of as many members as the assembly contains votes, and receiving from this act its
unity, its common identity, its life and its will.” 55 The only prerequisite to contribute to this
collective body is one’s personhood. However, once a member, this body forms a national
identity, or a sense of mutual belonging within the bounds of the state to which “the people”
gives itself, based on a mutual awareness of the contributions made by every participating
member to the group.
Not only are individuals within this collective bound by their mutual decision to
participate, but they are bound by national identity and by a mutual desire to protect their own
interests in regards to the sovereignty of the state. As Rousseau mentions with regard to Grotius,
the collective of “the people” holds more power united than a system of government itself.
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Collectively, “the people,” empowered in number, jointly form a group identity as members of a
shared nationality. In mutually belonging and participating in a nation-state, “the people” not
only become the foundation of the state that Grotius describes, but in a republic, the basis from
which a government will make all types of decisions regarding the treatment of its citizens and
foreign affairs.
If “the people” hold a collective identity due to their mutual concern for the protection of
their interests through voting and participating in their government, those unable to participate in
government are not part of this collective identity, nor the process by which governments make
decisions regarding its own people. All non-citizen residents, stateless people living in camps on
the borders of countries, or illegal foreigners are actively 56 excluded from “the people,” and from
the opportunity to reap the benefits associated with membership to this collective identity,
whether that be camaraderie, the identification with a nationality, a common ethnicity, or the
ability to have a voice in one’s government.
Again, the idea of natural-born liberty falls short within the idea of the collective
“people.” Whereas citizens are afforded liberty through their participation in the state, stateless
peoples without access to membership or even residence in a nation-state are left unable to
achieve liberty in this sense. Because the idea of natural-born liberty is reliant on the universal
distribution of that liberty to all persons, natural-born liberties cannot exist while the idea of “the
people,” a governmental group excluding certain identities, persists. Those who are denied the
liberties associated with membership in “the people” exist outside of both the collective identity
formed by “the people” and their own recognized personhood.
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The liberated man’s transcendence of nature

Rousseau recognizes the potential differences between individuals that form the
communal state. There are natural inequalities that account for the distinctions between people.
However, inequality does not affect one’s natural-born right to liberty. On inequality, Rousseau
comments, “instead of destroying natural inequality, the fundamental compact substitutes, for
such physical inequality as nature may have set up between men, an equality that is moral and
legitimate, and that men, who may be unequal in strength or intelligence, become every one
equal by convention and legal right.” 57 Therefore, under the state, people see the formation of
artificial equality, or state-sanctioned compensation for natural inequalities. Therefore, through a
recognition of difference, Rousseau crafts a state where undeniable equality based on one’s
natural right to liberty is granted, regardless of one’s circumstances.
The benefits to the formation of a state of artificial equality is the emergence of people
from a condition of nature to a state transcending the boundaries of nature. Though one’s natural
right to liberty is the basis of one’s membership in a state, the state allows all members to surpass
the line between civilization and nature. Rousseau claims,
“The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man, by
substituting justice, for instinct in his conduct, and giving his actions the morality they had formerly lacked.
Then only, when the voice of duty takes the place of physical impulses and right of appetite, does man,
who so far had considered only himself, find that he is forced to act on different principles, and to consult
his reason before listening to his inclinations. Although, in this state, he deprives himself of some
advantages which he got from nature, he gains in return others so great, his faculties are so stimulated and
developed, his ideas so extended, his feelings so ennobled, and his whole soul so uplifted, that, did not the
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abuses of this new condition often degrade him below that which he left, he would be bound to bless
continually the happy moment which took him from it forever, and, instead of a stupid and unimaginative
animal, made him an intelligent being and a man.” 58

The state, in this sense, is the voice of reason that complements the presence of human nature
within a person. While the purely raw existence of one’s natural “inclinations” is the
manifestation of the truest liberty, an individual who resigns their personhood to a nation-state
receives a separate, higher liberty in return: one that allows him to transcend the mere liberties of
acting on instinctive predispositions. Rousseau presents the idea of membership in a nation-state
as a transformative experience for an individual, claiming that only the experience of what can
be described as citizenship (membership of “the people,” and active participation in government)
within this state can lead one out of one’s natural state of disorganization and into an intelligent,
enlightened existence, in which one lives harmoniously with one’s fellow persons.
If this form of membership within a nation-state is the only form of liberated, intelligent
existence beyond the natural instinctive behavior governed by human nature, then only members
of functioning nation-states will have the opportunity to achieve this accession. The active
exclusion of stateless peoples in Rousseau’s argument appears not only within the exclusivity of
membership within a nation-state, but also in the impossibility of a rational existence without
that membership. Thus, stateless peoples, in their inability to access membership to any
particular nation-state, are bound to lives lacking meaning beyond their natural instincts, in
addition to lacking the liberties provided to members of a state by a government.
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Chapter 3: Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism and the role of statehood in
the protection of rights

In light of Rousseau’s analysis of “the people” in relation to the state, we can now investigate his
claim that natural-born liberties apply universally to all men. In this chapter, I address the issue
in my exploration of Hannah Arendt’s, “The Decline of the Nation State and the End of the
Rights of Man” in The Origins of Totalitarianism and determine the role the nation-state plays in
the continued exclusion of stateless refugees from society and from the physical territory of a
state. I turn to Arendt’s analysis of the nation-state in order to contest Rousseau’s assertion that
natural-born liberties are afforded to all due to one’s existence as a human being.

The Minority Treaties and collective national identities

Arendt begins her analysis of the nation-state in the context of the condition of many
European states immediately following World War I, when the first mass movement of migrants
afflicted European nations. Arendt discusses “the minority” as a collective issue for many of
those states, in which “minority treaties” were formed. 59 Minority treaties were essentially the
legal creation of a separate nationality, based at times on ethnicity or religion. These treaties
ensured that only the “trusted” citizens of the state held positions of power. Arendt claims, “The
result was that those peoples to whom states were not conceded, no matter whether they were
official minorities or only nationalities, considered the treaties an arbitrary game which handed
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out rule to some and servitude to others.” 60 The treaties essentially allowed for large portions of
the populations of newly-formed states following the war to go unnoticed in the eyes of law and
political participation. The minorities affected, thus, soon discovered that without the recognition
that accompanied citizenship and political association, rights were difficult to defend:

“The worst factor in this situation was not even that it became a matter of course for the nationalities to be
disloyal to their imposed government and for the governments to oppress their nationalities as efficiently as
possible, but that the nationally frustrated population was firmly convinced--as everybody else was--that
true freedom, true emancipation, and true popular sovereignty could be attained only with full national
emancipation, that people without their own national government were deprived of human rights.” 61

The treaties came to be known as an alternative method of forced assimilation for minority
populations affected, as, “the representatives of great nations knew only too well that minorities
within nation-states must sooner or later be either assimilated or liquidated.” 62 The maintenance
of a nation, in this sense, was dependent on the preservation of commonalities between members,
so much so that ethnic, religious or ideological difference could be considered a threat to the
cohesion of the populace. Minorities for nations within the League of Nations were now an
insistent force that could not be ignored. Arendt claims,

“The real significance of the Minority Treaties lies not in their practical application, but in the fact that they
were guaranteed by an international body, the League of Nations. Minorities had existed before, but the
minority as a permanent institution, the recognition that millions of people lived outside normal legal
protection and needed an additional guarantee of their elementary rights from an outside body, and the
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assumption that this state of affairs was not temporary but that the treaties were needed in order to establish
a lasting modus vivendi--all this was something new, certainly on such a scale, in European history.” 63

The Minority Treaties represent a form of institutionalized “othering” on the part of nations
under the influence of the League of Nations. In Section C, I will return to the analysis of Arendt
to discuss reasons behind the othering of stateless refugees. This fabricated chasm between
citizens and minority residents of nations created a stark contrast of rights:

“The Minority Treaties said in plain language what until then had been only implied in the working system
of nation-states, namely, that only nationals could be citizens, only people of the same national origin could
enjoy the full protection of legal institutions, that persons of different nationality needed some law of
exception until or unless they were completely assimilated and divorced from their origin.” 64

Here, Arendt nails down the critical point in her argument that protected rights can only be
achieved with membership within a nation-state. The primary concern at hand for minority
groups was exclusion on the basis of their identities, and the realization that non-membership
signified a lack of protected rights.
The defining factor in the exclusion of minority groups, Arendt argues, is the
predominant role of the nation within a nation-state. While the nation and the state maintain
some level of distinction, the nation acts upon the functioning of the state, inextricably linking
the two. Since the nation, as a collective grouping of people sharing a national identity within a
state, heavily influences the actions of a state, the exclusion of minorities that initially lack this
national identity becomes clear in the form of populism. Populism refers to the collective
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interests of average citizens. Average, in the context of the nation-state, refers to those holding
citizenship, and those who belong to the dominant national identity. In light of her claim that
only nationals could hold citizenship, and “only people of the same national origin could enjoy
the full protection of legal institutions,” Arendt notes, “the transformation of the state from an
instrument of the law into an instrument of the nation had been completed; the nation had
conquered the state, national interest had priority over law long before Hitler could pronounce
‘right is what is good for the German people.’” 65 This attitude of collectivity creates a dynamic
of opposition: that familiar aphorism of “us versus them.” The “us versus them” attitude plays
into populism, in that the “ordinary” citizen’s interests are always recognized, while those
deviating from a sense of collectivist populism are rarely acknowledged in a political setting.
The significance of Arendt’s claim in this matter, however, is the inherent integration of these
exclusionary attitudes in the institutional structure, and thus outward functioning, and governing,
of the nation-state. If popular opinion, originating from the collective stance of the nation,
influences government in the way that Arendt asserts, then stateless peoples, who do not occupy
any place of membership within a national identity, are systematically ostracized from the
foundational composition of a nation-state.
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The origins of stateless refugees

Arendt examines the origins of stateless people in Europe and the exclusion of stateless
peoples from nation-states, resulting from the rise of totalitarian regimes. Both during and
immediately following the World Wars, new legislation arose in nearly every country on the
European continent. As a result, millions of minority groups throughout varying nation-states on
the continent were denationalized. Arendt claims that these denationalizations were a result of a
rise in totalitarianism, and though a state may not yet have reached full totalitarianism, it, “at
least would not tolerate any opposition and would rather lose its citizens than harbor people with
different views.” 67 The connection between totalitarianism and the exclusion of minority groups
is bound by the link between populism and national identity. As populist notions of collective
interest dominate a governmental system, the nation supersedes the state, and the rule of law is
overcome by national opinion. It is the concept of national identity used within government that
allowed totalitarian rulers, such as Adolf Hitler, to dominate the political scene by promoting
ideas of exclusion and intolerance of difference.
Even though denationalization is a solution to the existence of minority groups within a
nation, it does not necessarily resolve the issue of the occupation of space by unwanted residents
of a state. The complication that arose following mass migrations of groups from neighboring
countries for many European nations was the physical exclusion of foreigners or previous
citizens who had been denationalized. Arendt mentions,

“The second great shock that the European world suffered through the arrival of the refugees was the
realization that it was impossible to get rid of them or transform them into nationals of the country of
67
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refuge. From the beginning everybody had agreed that there were only two ways to solve the problem:
repatriation or naturalization.” 68

The two options for handling mass migration, repatriation and naturalization, were impossible to
accomplish when European nations were met with thousands upon thousands of displaced
persons. Repatriation, which is the deportation of stateless peoples to another host country,
became literally impossible, as, “there was no country to which these people could be
deported.” 69 Undoubtedly, measures of repatriation were countered by the recent mutual
acceptance of European states of the right to self-determination. Self-determination, as Sarah
Fine claims, includes, in the practice of some nation-states, the right to exclude would-be
immigrants from their national identity and their territory, for any reason that they deem
sufficient. 70 In regards to repatriation, Arendt claims:

“[Measures of repatriation] failed not because of consideration for the stateless person… ...and not because
of humanitarian sentiments on the part of the countries that were swamped with refugees; but because
neither the country of origin nor any other agreed to accept the stateless person. It would seem that the very
undeportability of the stateless person should have prevented a government’s expelling him; bit since the
man without a state was ‘an anomaly for whom there is no appropriate niche in the framework of the
general law’--an outlaw by definition--he was completely at the mercy of the police, which itself did not
worry too much about committing a few illegal acts in order to diminish the country’s burden of
indésirables.” 71
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Repatriation therefore was not possible, and what became of efforts of repatriation was the mere
expulsion of stateless people, leaving them to fend for themselves on the literal geographic
margins of society. Evidently, naturalization was not an appealing option for nation-states; as
mass influxes of stateless refugees were showing up at their borders, the individual nation-states
had no desire to take on the responsibility of thousands of stateless bodies. In addition to the
quantity of persons, the intake of thousands of foreigners poses a serious risk to the
contamination of the existing national identity, with a mix of differing cultural practices and
ethnic origins. Rather than determining how to legalize stateless peoples, the question of the era,
Arendt claims, was, “How can the refugee be made deportable again?” 72
Throughout several philosophical texts, sweeping ethical claims are made regarding the
rights that stateless people deserve, or the rights reserved by human beings. In The Social
Contract, Rousseau insists upon the natural-born rights reserved by human beings, due to their
mere existence, claiming this is sufficient means to participate in the operations of a nation-state.
These rights, because they are attributed to all men, exist independently of the nation-state.
Following this assertion, Rousseau argues that it is the collective participation of men in the
nation-state that creates and redistributes equity among all members. In regards to stateless
people specifically, in “The Ethics of Immigration: Self-Determination and the Right to
Exclude,” Sarah Fine claims that the refugee’s right to safety from turmoil in their nation-state of
origin supersedes a host state’s right of self-determination to exclude that refugee. These ethical
claims, though idealistically valuable, cannot be upheld in the reality of statelessness. Though we
may have ethical convictions on how stateless refugees should act within a nation-state, these
concepts are inconsequential without the institutional support of a nation-state. In the following
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section, I use Arendt’s arguments on the Rights of Man to discuss why, philosophically,
systematic support of a nation-state is necessary for the maintenance of individual rights.

Arendt on the Rights of Man

Ethical convictions of human rights throughout Enlightenment-era philosophy were
defined by their inalienability, as they maintained their continuous existence autonomously from
the nation-state. Arendt poses an argument in response to this assertion that inalienability, in this
sense, is merely conceptual. The theory of inalienable rights does not account for the requirement
that a state with juridical power must be present in the defense of individual rights. While one
may think freely without saying a word, speaking one’s mind publicly is a right that requires
protection by a nation-state, and many nation-states hold policies against free expression like
such. The process by which a stateless person becomes rightless, Arendt explains, begins with
the loss of their home:

“The Rights of Man, supposedly inalienable, proved to be unenforceable--even in countries whose
constitutions were based upon them--whenever people appeared who were no longer citizens of any
sovereign state… ...The first loss which the rightless suffered was the loss of their homes… ...What is
unprecedented is not the loss of a home but the impossibility of finding a new one. Suddenly, there was no
place on earth where migrants could go without the severest restrictions, no country where they would be
assimilated, no territory where they could found a new community of their own… ...The second loss which
the rightless suffered was the loss of government protection, and this did not imply just the loss of legal
status in their own, but in all countries. Treaties of reciprocity and international agreements have woven a
web around the earth that makes it possible for the citizen of every country to take his legal status with him

55

no matter where he goes… ...Yet, whoever is no longer caught in it finds himself out of legality altogether
(thus during the last war stateless people were invariably in a worse position than enemy aliens who were
still indirectly protected by their governments through international agreements).” 73

Thus, citizenship is entirely exclusive to those who already possess it, with no place in the
intertwining web for people who have left what may have been their own protected rights behind
(though some stateless people are born without a nationality). The reasoning, however, behind
rightlessness furthers the complication of that matter: while stateless people find it difficult or
impossible to find a host country, this universal rejection means the loss of rights in their
entirety. Arendt explains:

“The fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place
in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective. Something much more fundamental
than freedom and justice, which are rights of citizens, is at stake when belonging to the community into
which one is born is no longer a matter of course and not belonging no longer a matter of choice, or when
one is placed in a situation where, unless he commits a crime, his treatment by others does not depend on
what he does or does not do. This extremity, and nothing else, is the situation of people deprived of human
rights. They are deprived, not of the right to freedom, but of the right to action; not of the right to think
whatever they please, but of the right to opinion.” 74

Here is where Arendt continues with the intangibility of inalienable rights: the protection of
rights by the nation-state is absolutely necessary for the maintenance of rights because of their
representation in government. A restriction of rights involves not one’s ability to eat, but the
ability to find work to then make enough to afford food. In a very physical sense, nation-states
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hold this control over stateless refugees. In their rejection of masses of stateless refugees, nationstates have ensured on an expansive scale that some have unlimited liberties, while some live on
the outskirts of societies, with no option but to live in a state of rightlessness.
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Section C
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Chapter 4: The formation of national identities

Recall that in The Social Contract, Rousseau references Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius’
stance on the collective identity of “the people.” Though essentially powerless individually, “the
people” hold enormous power when banded together in defense of their mutual interests in the
face of the state. Discussing the role of the nation, Rousseau mentions Grotius:

“A people, says Grotius, can give itself to a king. Then, according to Grotius, a people is a people before it
gives itself. The gift is itself a civil act, and implies public deliberation. It would be better, before
examining the act by which a people gives itself to a king, to examine that by which it has become a
people; for this act, being necessarily prior to the other, is the true foundation of society.” 75

If the foundation of society is “the people,” and the state builds itself atop this collective, then
“the people” must be the basis upon which law and order is established. As the people determine
their rights collectively, how do those common interests lead to policies that greatly affects the
freedoms and rights of stateless refugees? Throughout this section, I critique the formations of
national identities, and the differentiation between self-identified national communities and those
existing outside of these groups. I examine the intertwining relationships that migrants and
stateless refugees hold with these national communities, and seek to uncover the attitudes that
lead to the exclusion of outsiders.
In his discussion of cultural bonds, Samuel Scheffler highlights the significant role that
culture plays in the formation of mutual ties within a national community. When a people share
similar origins, even from living in the same territory, a very particular bond is formed among
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them, which grows to isolate that group from others who do not share in that common
experience. Scheffler writes:

“A country’s unity is both expressed in and sustained by its citizens’ shared sense of history; by their
mutual recognition of national holidays, symbols, myths, and ceremonies; by their allegiance to a common
set of values; and by their participation in a range of informal customs and tendencies covering virtually
every aspect of life, including modes of dress, habits of thought, styles of music, humor, and entertainment,
patterns of work and leisure, attitudes toward sex and sexuality, and tastes in food and drink.” 76

This relationship is defined by the harmony between members of a national community in the
mutual defense of their own interests, as they contribute to the governing of their state by
participating as active citizens. 77 However, when this collective, built on mutual understanding,
is confronted with individuals or a group cultivated by different worldviews and an entirely
variant understanding of culture, that harmony becomes antagonism. In this regard, Scheffler
claims,

“Immigrants arrive with their own histories and traditions, customs and values, habits and ceremonies. The
features and practices that define the host nation’s distinctive identity--the very features that give its
nonimmigrant citizens the sense of belonging to a single people--are experienced by immigrants as
unfamiliar at best, and alienating or oppressive at worst.” 78
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The nation’s “distinctive identity” formed from all the factors that Scheffler describes above
serves as oppressive to immigrants when they arrive in their host nation, where the national
community makes up the majority of citizens and the attitude to this confrontation is exclusive
rather than inclusive. Scheffler notes, “All too often, the symbols of inclusion and commonality
are thus transformed into emblems of exclusion and discord.” 79 Thus, unable to conform to the
cultural identity of the majority, resident migrants are forced to endure this hostility.
The state’s response to the confrontation of differing cultures, Scheffler claims, could
only take one of three forms:

“It can resort to a kind of cultural apartheid, refusing to grant equal recognition or status to the traditions
and practices of the newcomers, and enforcing as best it can the symbols of the old identity. Or it can
abandon the old identity and reconceive itself as a multicultural society with a new, pluralistic identity. In
practice, of course, there is also a third option, which may be the most popular one of all. This is to avoid
honestly confronting the choice between the first two options, and to muddle along trying to have it both
ways: paying lip service to the ideas of pluralism and multiculturalism without abandoning the privileged
position of the dominant culture, and resorting to serious national soul-searching only when, periodically,
the conflict simmering just below the surface of the social fabric erupts into a full-fledged crisis.” 80

This third option, seen often in racial crossroads in the United States, is often what leads to the
continued discrimination of resident migrants in a host nation-state, as the state makes no effort
to defend the clear minority from the oppressions of the majority. With subtle reinforcements of
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the “old identity,” the minority forms a grouping of second-class citizens who are permitted to
exist, but not in a robust way. Racial conflicts in the United States have come to mirror this
“option” that Scheffler discusses. The state, in the post-slavery era, refuses to politically address
the racial difference and discrimination against people of African descent, meaning that laws
governing the population did not defend people of African descent from the discrimination they
faced as a result of their visible difference from the white majority and national community.
Enforcements of the “old identity” appear in the form of segregation in the 20th century or white
nationalism, remaining confederate monuments, and disproportionate police brutality against
people of color. Though Black people are now permitted to exist as citizens, they may not exist,
in the 21st century United States, in a way that would disrupt the privilege of the dominant
culture, which has a strong history of white supremacy. In this way, like migrants living in host
nation-states, their existence is marginal: not only do they lack full citizenship (regardless of
their immigration statuses), but they are forcibly distinguished from the majority and the
privileges associated with membership.
The stateless refugee, like the person of African descent, cannot conform to the cultural
majority defined by Scheffler, as they share in none of the cultural commonalities that define
national communities. Stateless refugees, though not residents within a state like AfricanAmericans, still share the experience of exclusion that African-Americans have living in a
culture dominated by white supremacy. Being outsiders, stateless refugees may share no cultural,
racial, or historical ties to the United States that many Americans recognize as a crucial part of
the American identity. Like Black people in the United States, stateless refugees cannot be fully
seen as American by the dominant groups because of their origins, however ancient, as
foreigners. However, the stakes for stateless refugees are higher. Unlike resident migrants,
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stateless refugees exist marginally in a literal sense: they are unable to cross international
borders, as they face rejection on all sides from neighboring nations. Remaining completely
rightless without a national identity, stateless refugees garner no mercy from nation-states who
maintain the third route of cultural confrontation that Scheffler presents. I will come to address
later in this section the question of the usefulness of the refugee, in which I will question the
relationship between the national community and the outsider.
Race also plays an extremely important role in the exclusion of stateless refugees from
national communities, especially ones that share racial identities. Many European countries are
faced with the brunt of the refugee crisis of the 21st century have strong cultural ties to racial
identities, many of which have been in existence for hundreds of years. In The Origins of
Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt discusses the development of a national community in England
throughout the 18th century, during which social classes in England were surprisingly
collaborative in building a political system in which liberty could essentially be “inherited” by
any man. This concept mirrors Rousseau’s suggestion in The Social Contract that liberties are
afforded to every man solely because of his existence and willingness to actualize these liberties
within a functioning society. The idea of the inheritance of liberty was closely tied to land
ownership and the holding of titles, including citizenship and the ability to participate in
government on that basis. Although the concept of the Rights of Man, inherently including all
men, would have normally seemed intimidating to the wealthy classes in Britain, the concept of
the inheritance of liberty manifested itself in a way that satisfied all class levels. Arendt writes,

“Without encroaching upon the rights of the privileged class within the English nation, [Irish statesman and
philosopher Edmund] Burke enlarged the principle of these privileges [of inheritance] to include the whole
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English people, establishing them as a kind of nobility among nations. Hence he drew his contempt for
those who claimed their franchise as the rights of men, rights which he saw fit to claim only as ‘the rights
of Englishmen.’” 81

Though these rights were inherited universally among English men, applying these same
privileges to men existing outside of the British kingdom is another philosophical question.
The inheritance of rights created a society in which widespread responsibility for the
good of the nation was distributed among social classes. Though there still remained a certain
level of social control held by the wealthiest, most powerful class, there was significant
involvement of the lower classes in the running of the government:

“In England nationalism developed without serious attacks on the old feudal classes. This has been possible
because the English gentry, from the seventeenth century on and in ever-increasing numbers, had
assimilated the higher ranks of the bourgeoisie, so that sometimes even the common man could attain the
position of a lord. By this process much of the ordinary caste arrogance of nobility was taken away and a
considerable sense of responsibility for the nation as a whole was created.” 82

Sharing in the inherited liberties of British men, a national community was created. With the
inclusion of the lower classes in this identity, the juridical power of the nation-state grew even
stronger both in number and in moral assertions surrounding the liberties of men, so it seemed.
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The exception to the seemingly universal axiom that liberty can be inherited by all men
presented itself throughout the age of colonialism, in which the African man first forced himself
into the philosophical equation. Unable to ignore this puzzling complication on the basis of logic,
Europeans who had long believed in the inalienability of rights, like Rousseau and other
philosophers had argued during the age of Enlightenment, were forced to confront the “physical
differences” between whiteness and non-whiteness. The response to these people, Arendt claims,
was complicated:
“Ever since the European peoples made practical attempts to include all the peoples of the earth in their
conception of humanity, they have been irritated by the great physical differences between themselves and
the peoples they found on other continents. The eighteenth-century enthusiasm for the diversity in which
the all-present identical nature of man and reason could find expression provided a rather thin cover of
argument to the crucial question, whether the Christian tenet of the unity and equality of all men, based
upon common descent from one original set of parents, would be kept in the hearts of men who were faced
with tribes, which, as far as we know, never had found by themselves any adequate expression of human
reason or human passion in either cultural deeds or popular customs, and which had developed human
institutions only to a very low level.” 83

Though philosophical thought regarding the existence of a variety of races differed among
philosophers and among nations, the idea of inherited freedom certainly did not immediately
apply to people of color in European colonies, nor on European soil. Colonization and slavery
still took place following the development of these ideals of liberty, regardless of the questioning
of slavery’s validity that took place under Christian moral declarations. 84
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Though attempts were made to justify the philosophical claim that men inherit inalienable
liberties, this assertion was only true within the context of the nation-state, and only applied
internally. The formation of a national community under the inheritance of liberties that
developed in England was a direct result of the exclusivity of the condition that these liberties
only apply to Englishmen. There is a difference, Arendt points out, between the “Rights of
Englishmen” and the Rights of Men. The prioritization of the liberties of one’s community over
the liberties of all men is a contributing factor to the exclusion of stateless refugees from nationstates, and from national communities. In what follows, I will examine the ways in which
stateless refugees are identified as outsiders from national communities, and how their
ostracization is maintained through exclusionary attitudes.
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Chapter 5: An analysis of the attitudes of the serious man in Simone de Beauvoir’s The Ethics of
Ambiguity

Freedom and choice as they are intertwined with institutional powers

In The Ethics of Ambiguity, Simone de Beauvoir builds an analysis of freedom as it
relates to gender, individuality, and one’s relationality to the real course of events in the world
around them. De Beauvoir identifies certain all-encompassing attitudes towards the world and
towards others that are primary factors leading to the treatment of others as insignificant. She
begins her analysis of freedom by discussing free choice in the context of Kantian and Marxist
notions of free will. De Beauvoir claims,

“[Marxists today] declare authoritatively that the existence of freedom would make any concerted
enterprise impossible. According to them, if the individual were not constrained by the external world to
want this rather than that, there would be nothing to defend him against his whims. Here, in different
language, we again meet the charge formulated by the respectful believer of supernatural imperatives. In
the eyes of the Marxist, as of the Christian, it seems that to act freely is to give up justifying one’s acts.
This is a curious reversal of the Kantian ‘you must; therefore, you can.’ Kant postulates freedom in the
name of morality. The Marxist, on the contrary, declares, ‘You must; therefore, you can not.’ To him a
man’s action seems valid only if the man has not helped set it going by an internal movement. To admit the
ontological possibility of a choice is already to betray the Cause.” 85

On one hand, the Kantian perspective of free will is highly individualized, holding that
individual actions are directly connected to the eventual outcome. On the other hand, the Marxist
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holds the conviction that the individual holds no influence over the external world, and that
human action has virtually no effect on the ultimate outcome of the order of the universe. Arendt
introduces her arguments surrounding individuality and relationality with others by presenting
these schools of thought, both totalizing in their certitude, as two extreme worldviews too
polarized in their foundational assertions to represent the reality of the truthful order of things.
De Beauvoir believes that reality can be pinned somewhere on a spectrum stretching between
these belief systems.
However, de Beauvoir introduces the Marxist and the Kantian argument to introduce a
player in the grand scheme of order, which she calls the “serious man.” Unable to see the forest
for the trees, the serious man represents an embodiment of willful ignorance in which, terrified
of the reality of the unpredictability of the universe, he sacrifices his freedom to an invented and
arbitrary order, bringing down with him the freedom of others. Though I will discuss in detail the
particularities of the serious man later in this section, it is important to introduce him in order to
understand how his role in the order of the universe contributes to the role of “othering”
throughout de Beauvoir’s text, and the perpetuation of othering through de Beauvoir’s arguments
surrounding the serious man as they implicate many global citizens of the societal exclusion of
stateless refugees. As the stateless refugee is often the victim of othering by being assigned a
given and inextricable identity of “Other” as a result of their very existence at the margins of
society and of the nation-state, the distinction between the Self and the Other as expressed
through de Beauvoir’s arguments about the serious man will speak volumes about the exclusion
of stateless refugees.
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“Othering,” Orientalism, and the serious man

Edward Said discusses othering, which can be defined by the segregation of the Other by
the Self, in his work Orientalism. Said argues that Western perceptions of the “East” created an
alternate, invented identity for “Eastern” peoples through Orientalism, and that these perceptions
eventually have real influence on the lived experiences of people originating from the East in the
United States. For example, the “Arab,” Said argues, lives entirely outside of American society,
for constructed perceptions of his culture and his values prevent him from engaging in politics
and thus he becomes nonexistent. These perceptions, Said claims, are created entirely by
Westerners: “it is Europe that articulates the Orient; this articulation is the prerogative, not of a
puppet master, but of a genuine creator, whose life-giving power represents, animates,
constitutes the otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries.” 86 The Orient
without the West exists, but has no place in discussion in Western society without Orientalism.
Additionally, people originating from the places which are typically fetishized through
Orientalism have no say in their constructed identities:

“The Orient was Orientalized not only because it was discovered to be ‘Oriental’ in all those ways
considered common-place by an average nineteenth-century European, but also because it could be-that is,
submitted to being-made Oriental. There is very little consent to be found, for example, in the fact that
Flaubert's encounter with an Egyptian courtesan produced a widely influential model of the Oriental
woman; she never spoke of herself, she never represented her emotions, presence, or history. He spoke for
and represented her. He was foreign, comparatively wealthy, male, and these were historical facts of
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domination that allowed him not only to possess Kuchuk Hanem physically but to speak for her and tell his
readers in what way she was ‘typically Oriental.’” 87

The formation of the “Oriental” on the part of Eurocentric minds, specifically an undesirable
Oriental, allowed for a point of differentiation against which European values and societal
strengths were idealized. Not only were Europeans distinguished from the Orient, but their
superiority was romanticized:

“Orientalism is never far from what Denys Hay has called the idea of Europe, a collective notion
identifying "us" Europeans as against all "those" non-Europeans, and indeed it can be argued that the major
component in European culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe:
the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and
cultures.” 88

The interesting dynamic presented by Said between the European Self (they who other) and the
Oriental Other is more than a simple differentiation. As the Orient is by nature invented, the
continual construction of the Oriental other to the European becomes all that the European is not.
While the Self is intelligent, militarily strong, reliable and beautiful, the Other is foolish, weak,
unreliable and exotic. Therefore, following Said’s argument, when the vantage point of the Self
positions the Self as human, the Other, opposite in nature, is not human.
Othering can be understood through a theoretical binary, as the Other is always existing
in opposition to the Self. Philosophically, and as othering most likely manifests practically, it is
she who distinguishes that determines the conditions of differentiation. When applied practically
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to human beings, othering occurs most commonly in situations of notable difference, in which
she who others creates a vantage point of determining who and what can be differentiated from
herself. This vantage point creates the foundation for the “other,” which is that which the Other
becomes at the hands of they who others, or the Self. The Other, formed as a result of the act of
othering, exists only after a vantage point is created and upheld by she who determines. The
inhumanity of the Other, then, is only asserted once the Self has been self-identified as human.
This assertion explains the philosophical nature of the development of the Self and the Other
abstractly, rather than conforming to a singular example.
In the context of the refugee crisis, the Self and the Other are certainly prevailing
categories that regulate political policies and social attitudes toward stateless refugees. The
formation of the Self and the Other nestles in the rifts between nationalities, cultural belonging,
ethnicities, and other forms of identity. It becomes far easier to geographically and socially
exclude a group of stateless people when there exists a widely-accepted understanding that
stateless people lack humanity. As Said argues, the collective identity of “us,” which pertains to
a national group backed by the political and juridical power of a nation-state, is distinguished
from “those,” who exist outside of borders, beyond the reach of protected rights. When the
national collective “us” self-identifies as human in direct opposition to “those,” exclusion of the
inhuman outsider is easily justified. How can someone who lacks humanity provide anything of
value to the national community?
Said’s arguments relate heavily to de Beauvoir’s analysis of the serious man, as he
represents the formation of the idea of the Self and the Other, in which an individual is blinded
by their own conception of the order of all things to believe that their worldview is superior to
that of others. The serious man holds strong convictions regarding the order of things, and
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believes wholeheartedly in the objectivity of his world. In believing so, he is imposing his
convictions on all who live within his realm. Any view that differs from his fundamental
ideologies falls into question, and he does not hesitate to question the serious, so long as it is the
seriousness of another. As the serious man wholly believes in the superiority of his worldview,
he is inclined to impose it upon others. Similar to the arguments that appear in Orientalism, the
serious man distinguishes between himself and the Other, but is unable to see the Other for what
it is independently of himself, and instead takes his worldview as the objective truth.

The submission and subjugation of the serious man

Throughout section II of The Ethics of Ambiguity, de Beauvoir discusses differing
attitudes that lead to varying types freedoms depending on how one places oneself in the order of
the world. One’s relationality to others affects one’s freedoms, and thus the freedoms of others as
well. In particular, de Beauvoir focuses on the egocentrism of the serious man. She introduces
the concept of the serious man in terms of an attitude of fearing one’s own existence in the
unpredictable world. The serious man, afraid of his own subjectivity, holds a wholehearted fear
of the “unforeseen,” which may only remind him of his own consciousness. About the serious
man, de Beauvoir claims, “[the serious man] forces himself to submerge his freedom in the
content which the latter accepts from society. He loses himself in the object in order to annihilate
his subjectivity.” 89 The serious man ignores his own subjectivity, and thus, that of others, by
clouding it with a supposed objective truth that deflects the reality of uncertainty in the world.
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The underlying claim in her argument is that true freedom arises from one’s embrace of the
unknown, of the reality of the world which lies in the unforeseen. In his rejection of the unseen,
the serious man is not truly free.
The serious man poses a critical danger to the freedom of others. If the serious man is
willing to sacrifice his own freedom to live in an alternate reality of ignorance, he must be
willing to sacrifice the freedoms of others. Regarding this claim, de Beauvoir asserts,

“If one denies the subjective tension of freedom one is evidently forbidding himself universally to will
freedom in an indefinite movement… ...It is natural that he makes himself a tyrant. Dishonestly ignoring
the subjectivity of his choice, he pretends that the unconditioned value of the object is being asserted
through him; and by the same token he also ignores the value of the subjectivity and the freedom of others,
to such an extent that, sacrificing them to the thing he persuades himself that what he sacrifices is
nothing.” 90

In this sense, the serious man is a danger to others in that he is entirely ignorant of the effect his
sacrifice will have on others, and genuinely takes his own worldview for the objective truth. In
deliberately imposing this viewpoint over others at the cost of their freedoms, he becomes a
tyrant. Thus, with little regard for the freedoms of others, the serious man is dangerous, as he is a
threat not only to himself but to the universal liberties of others. In attempt to control his
surroundings, he “stubbornly engulfs his transcendence in the object which bars the horizon and
bolts the sky.” 91 Though the serious man already holds a position of power over others, as he is
willing to sacrifice their freedoms, the serious man in a position of institutional power holds all
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the more leverage. A prime minister, for example, with an attitude of seriousness in which he is
in complete denial of the uncertainties of the world, would likely attempt to control the fates of
others when implementing legislation regarding immigration policies in his land. De Beauvoir
calls out the serious man in past attempts at colonialism:

“In order to justify the contradictory, absurd, and outrageous aspects of this kind of behavior, the serious
man readily takes refuge in disputing the serious, but it is the serious of others which he disputes, not his
own. Thus, the colonial administrator is not unaware of the trick of irony. He contests the importance of the
happiness, the comfort, the very life of the native, but he reveres the Highway, the Economy, the French
Empire; he reveres himself as a servant of these divinities.” 92

Serious men in positions of power, such as the colonial administrator, not only pose a risk to
others in their attitudes, but a risk to others with the extent of the power that they hold in office
to disenfranchise others.
In the sacrificing of his own freedom, the serious man sacrifices the freedoms of others.
In the sacrificing of the freedoms of others, and in the questioning of their happiness, their
behavior, and the legitimacy of their lifestyles, he differentiates between himself and others. The
serious man creates a chasm of identity between himself and the others which he willingly
subjugates to his own senseless repression of subjectivity. What is important to the serious man
is what is important to all, for in rejecting his own subjectivity the serious man negates the
subjectivity of others. The freedoms of others are inherently tied to the freedoms of the serious
man, because in the ignorance of passing his own subjectivity for the objective truth, he ignores
the subjectivity of others, and thus constructs a comprehension of the universe in which others
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have no opportunity or right to hold a worldview that differs from his invented truth. In
deliberately blinding himself from the objective truth of the unforeseen nature of the world, the
guiding ethical principles followed and held in reverence by the serious man become universally
applicable in his worldview, and the guiding values of others fall into his question.
The concept that responsibility for all men is contained in the actions of one man has
been discussed widely by existentialist philosophers. Jean-Paul Sartre examined the concepts of
subjectivity and “will” in a lecture given at the Club Maintenant in Paris on October 29, 1945.
Sartre delves into the idea that in Atheist existentialism, man precedes his own essence:

“If God does not exist, there is at least one being in whom existence precedes essence--a being whose
existence comes before its essence, a being who exists before he can be defined by any concept of it. That
being is man, or, as Heidegger put it, the human reality. What do we mean here by ‘existence precedes
essence’? We mean that man first exists: he materializes in the world, encounters himself, and only
afterward defines himself… ...Man is not only that which he conceives himself to be, but that which he
wills himself to be, and since he conceives of himself only after he exists, just as he wills himself to be after
being thrown into existence, man is nothing other than what he makes of himself.” 93

Analyzing the existence of “human nature,” Sartre insists that because man is left to define
himself and because he precedes his essence, there must be no such thing as human nature, as the
concept of human nature is defined by man’s actions. Sartre then examines the subjectivity of
man, stating,

“Man first exists; that is, that man primarily exists--that man is, before all else, something that projects
itself into a future, and is conscious of doing so. Man is indeed a project that has a subjective existence,
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rather unlike that of a patch of moss, a spreading fungus, or a cauliflower. Prior to that projection of the
self, nothing exists, not even in divine intelligence, and man shall attain existence only when he is what he
projects himself to be--not what he would like to be.” 94

In claiming that subjectivity is man’s consciousness of his projection of self, he asserts that “man
is responsible for what he is.” 95 However, Sartre implies with his claim of the subjectivity of
man that subjectivity can, in fact, mean both, “the freedom of the individual subject to choose
what he will be, and, on the other, man’s inability to transcend subjectivity.” 96 Sartre explains,

“When we say that man chooses himself, not only do we mean that each of us must choose himself, but
also that in choosing himself, he is choosing for all men. In fact, in creating the man each of us wills ourselves to be,
there is not a single one of our actions that does not at the same time create an image of man as we think he ought to
be. 97

As man precedes his own essence and is left to define himself through what he wills for himself,
he cannot will anything at all without willing that same thing for all men, who are collectively
creating the essence that they lacked. This essence cannot be individual, as by nature it is
representative of “man” in an overarching sense, including all men. Therefore, Sartre claims,
“When we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for
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his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men.” 98 In relation to de Beauvoir’s text,
the serious man exhibits behavior that implies that he is entirely ignorant of the responsibility
that Sartre discusses. Unable to recognize the consequences for others as a result of his actions,
the serious man remains in a constant state of internal ethical controversy, and remains a threat to
the liberties of others.
De Beauvoir illustrates how the life conditions for many people could result from
attitudes such as those of the serious man. De Beauvoir begins the second section of The Ethics
of Ambiguity with an analogy, in which she compares the lives of many people deprived of
liberty with those of children. Children, like the serious man, live in a constricted reality.
However, de Beauvoir claims that while the child’s reality is inflicted upon them, the serious
man willingly sacrifices his freedoms to the object to which he is committed, in attempt to forget
the painful reality of his own subjectivity. The child, de Beauvoir claims, enters the world
completely unaware of their surroundings, why their environment is the way that it is, or how it
came to be. De Beauvoir uses the term “ready-made” to describe the surroundings of a child as
they grow into the world around them, as they have no power in determining the conditions of
their surroundings. The child, de Beauvoir claims, is:

“cast into a universe which he has not helped to establish, which has been fashioned without him, and
which appears to him as an absolute to which he can only submit. In his eyes, human inventions, words,
customs, and values are given facts, as inevitable as the sky and the trees. This means that the world in

98

Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, trans. Carol Macomber (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2007), 23.

77

which he lives is a serious world, since the characteristic of the spirit of seriousness is to consider values as
ready-made things.” 99

Thus, the serious man evolves from a childhood of forced submission to his environment into a
state of adult ignorance, in which he receives an opportunity for freedom. Once realizing the true
reality of the uncertainty of the world, the adolescent is faced with a choice: they may either
recognize the conditions of reality or continue to submerge themselves in the interest of ignoring
their own subjectivity. The serious man, in choosing to sacrifice his freedoms, chooses to live in
an infantile world like the very child that de Beauvoir describes.
Though the serious man, upon reaching adolescence, has the choice to withdraw himself
from a life of ignorance and avoidance of the stress of his own existence, some are not afforded
that liberty. De Beauvoir discusses the dismal existence of many who are held captive by this
infantile world, disenfranchised from their ability to opt out of a life of ignorance by social,
economic or political limitations that do not allow them to fully embrace freedom. Of these
groups, de Beauvoir claims,

“These are beings whose life slips by in an infantile world because, having been kept in a state of servitude
and ignorance, they have no means of breaking the ceiling which is stretched over their heads. Like the
child, they can exercise their freedom, but only within this universe which has been set up before them,
without them… ...This is also the situation of women in many civilizations; they can only submit to the
laws, the gods, the customs, and the truths created by the males. Even today in western countries, among
women who have not had in their work an apprenticeship of freedom, there are still many who take shelter
in the shadow of men; they adopt without discussion the opinions and values recognized by their husband
or lover, and that allows them to develop childish qualities which are forbidden to adults because they are
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based on a feeling of irresponsibility… ...the child’s situation is imposed upon him, whereas the woman (I
mean the western woman of today) chooses it or at least consents to it. Ignorance and error are facts as
inescapable as prison walls.” 100

For those living in an infantile world, there is hardly an opportunity for freedom to be truly
employed all of the time, though de Beauvoir claims that under a state of oppression, the
oppressed may realize a perfect assertion of their freedom. However, she claims, “once there
appears a possibility of liberation, it is resignation of freedom not to exploit the possibility, a
resignation which implies dishonesty and which is a positive fault.” 101 This opportunity, for
many, may never arise.
Though it is the serious man that consistently reaffirms his alternate reality for himself,
some are bound by their surroundings to the ignorance of the pain of existence. Some lack an
instrument of escape, or are enslaved. De Beauvoir claims, “The less economic and social
circumstances allow an individual to act upon the world, the more this world appears to him as
given.” 102 Therefore, the less one possesses the proper tools to combat the oppression of their
surroundings, the more submissive one is to the illusion of their environmental conditions.
Somewhat like the western woman who is de Beauvoir’s subject, the stateless refugee
severely lacks the social, economic or political tools to combat their oppressive surroundings. As
shown by Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism, the stateless person exists constantly on the
edge of legality, and outside of the realm of human rights. Without the protection of a nationstate, the stateless refugee remains quite literally in the most vulnerable position in terms of
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facing the onslaught of oppressive social, political and economic exclusion directed towards
them. Like de Beauvoir claims about individual circumstances, the stateless refugee is bound by
the physical and juridical borders set in place by countries aiming to prevent their entry into
private territories. Many forces work simultaneously to create an infantile existence for stateless
refugees: physical borders, such as walls, fences, border security and refugee camps keep
stateless refugees physically stationary, while international immigration laws, frequent rejection
of asylum applications and extremely difficult and competitive visa applications maintain the
prevention of stateless refugees from entering the territories of neighboring nation-states.
Regardless of their efforts to obtain legal statuses, these forces create an enormous wave of
rebuttal.
In many ways, then, the stateless refugee is force to live in the infantile world that de
Beauvoir describes. The stateless refugee experiences the “ready-made” environment that the
child does, upon leaving their country of origin. Whether the stateless refugee arrives in a
refugee camp for the first time, or lives on the border of a neighboring nation-state, unable to
enter, their circumstances are likely to be entirely out of their control. Surrounding the stateless
refugee are borders, both physical and metaphysical, and many pressing collaborative forces to
push them back and forth, away from the physical borders of neighboring nation-states. The
stateless refugee lacks the rights, as they lack a nation-state to protect those rights, and the
political tools to fight back against these forces, and thus remains in a condition of unwanted
stasis, where neither progress nor personal choice is allowed. Like de Beauvoir’s child, or
enslaved persons, the stateless refugee cannot contribute to the outcome of their own fate due to
their lack of political tools, but still must surrender their liberties as a result of the serious man’s
persistence. Only in exceptional circumstances does an opportunity to seek escape prevent itself,
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and this occurs most regularly for those with monetary resources to support that endeavor.
Similar to de Beauvoir’s claim regarding enslaved peoples, the less access one has to resources
of combating oppression, the more likely one is to succumb to a life dominated by that
subjugation. Boxed in from all sides, the stateless refugee with no access to resources can only
approach the world as a given, like de Beauvoir’s child. 103 Unlike the serious man, the stateless
refugee has no opportunity to make choices about their oppression, and remains helpless in their
experience of forced exclusion.
The institutions that withhold the stateless refugee from a life of free choice act in the
exact manner to as de Beauvoir’s serious man, in the attitudes he expresses regarding the
ignorance of others’ subjectivities. De Beauvoir never speaks of the serious man in a collective
sense, only addressing his attitudes at an individual level. However, at a systematic level, the
same willful ignorance, the same careless sacrifice of the freedoms of others for which the
stateless man is responsible is carried out by nation-states in their enforcement of immigration
law. Like the serious man, nation-states hold the freedoms of others in their hands, by willingly
sacrificing their own freedom to a certain order, rather than the reality of the world. Borders, in
many senses, are arbitrary boundaries, created by a state to maintain a certain sense of
exclusivity and protection from external threat. The stateless refugee poses a risk to the nationstate in several ways that have been discussed in previous chapters: in cultural disruption, in use
of resources and the occupation of space, and in the breach of a collective national identity. This
supposed order, namely the rule of (immigration) law, is created by the nation-state to maintain
this sense of protection. However, according to de Beauvoir’s analysis of the attitudes of the
serious man, it is only the fear of his own existence, of his own subjectivity, that causes the
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serious man to subscribe to the protection of his constructed objective truth. The protection that
the serious man’s subjective viewpoint offers him is none other than the protection from the
painful experience of the truthful order of the world. Using de Beauvoir’s argument structure in
the context of institutional borders, it would seem that the protection a nation-state seeks when
actively denying access to a stateless refugee is that from the truthful order of the world, which is
that all races and national identities can exist alongside one another, and that stateless refugees,
like the citizens of a nation-state, have inherent freedoms. 104
Collectively, the collaborative opposing forces of many nation-states have an even
greater effect on the exclusion of the stateless refugee. Though de Beauvoir discusses the serious
man in an individual context, when theoretically applying her argument structure to a greater
context one can see the serious man in the actions nation-states take to protect their national
communities from the invasion of foreigners. When not just few, but many nation-states share
the attitudes of the serious man, the stateless refugee experiences an even greater sense of
betrayal: not only are their freedoms sacrificed by one nation-state, but a vast number of
institutional systems together. These systems act as an oppressive force that permeates all aspects
of the freedoms of stateless refugees. In the case of a stateless refugee relegated to life in a
refugee camp, the life they lead is a liminal existence; without the protection of rights state under
a state, the refugee lives without recognition from neighboring populations and juridical bodies.
Under the shield of the protection of their citizens, nations that contribute to the exclusion of
stateless refugees willingly sacrifice their freedoms.
Beginning with the Self and the Other, the exclusion and oppression of the Other occurs
as a result of the imposition of the Self’s beliefs on the Other. Throughout the works of Said and
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de Beauvoir, the Self, becomes a dangerous weapon of control, in which the Other becomes
subjugated to the whims of the Self, unable to escape the worldviews that have been imposed
upon them. While the Orientalist in Said’s work constructs an identity of the “Orient” and the
people within it, de Beauvoir’s serious man asserts his own subjective worldview to be objective
truth, enforcing his worldview on all. The opposition between the Self and the Other lingers
throughout the philosophy of statelessness, which I will explore in the following chapter.
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Chapter 6: A collective examination of Thomas Nail’s The Figure of the Migrant, Simone de
Beauvoir’s The Ethics of Ambiguity, Edward Said’s Orientalism, and Hannah Arendt’s The
Origins of Totalitarianism

Throughout the discussion of statelessness there persists the issue of usefulness. As in de
Beauvoir’s discussion of the serious man, only the usefulness of migrants in the context of
immigration is questioned, while the usefulness of nationals, or those holding membership within
the dominant national community, is never challenged by the dominant social narrative. In
Thomas Nail’s The Figure of the Migrant, he proposes an interpretation of social illusions of
stasis directed towards migrants, which I will claim is a result of this notion of usefulness. While
all-powerful, the social illusion of stasis is indeed an illusion. Nail claims that stasis is the
impression that many naturalized citizens, or holders of “productive” jobs, have of maintenance
jobs held disproportionately by migrants, which are not seen as valuable contributions to society.
Nail identifies his conception of stasis, and claims that it is nothing but a social illusion that has
grand consequences for those oppressed by the impressions left by the illusion. He provides an
example as such:

“to understand migration and movement as lack is to accept the banality of social dispossession. For
example, every day our cities must be maintained, remade, built up, torn down, and cleaned. Our office
buildings and homes are cleaned and maintained while we are away by an underground and largely
invisible reproductive labor force disproportionately composed of migrants. What appears to be the
relatively static place we call “society” is constantly being modified through the cleaning and maintenance
of labor. Without this labor, our cities, homes, and streets would be unusable. Yet these sorts of
reproductive labor are often paid less and are less valorized than their “productive” counterparts are. The
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appearance of social stasis in this case is an illusion of the capitalist division between productive and
reproductive labor.” 105

Nail argues that we should not understand migration and movement as “lack,” but rather that
migration and movement provide progress for societies. To see productive work, such as the
maintenance of cities as anything other than linear movement is to misunderstand the
significance of migrant work.
In fact, Nail defines migration by its productivity. Recalling the definition of migration
that Nail provides, he claims:

“The movement of the migrant is not simply from A to B but is the constitutive condition for the qualitative
transformation of society as a whole. The migrant not only undergoes an extensive movement but also
affects an intensive or qualitative social movement of the whole of society itself. In this sense, the figure of
the migrant is a socially constitutive power. It is the subjective figure that allows society to move and
change.” 106

Not only is the migrant defined by the progression it institutes in societies, but societies are
actually reliant on this catalyst to function at all. Although not all work to maintain cities is done
by migrants, Nail identifies that statistically, maintenance jobs that are deemed invaluable or
“unproductive” by nationals are often adopted by migrants, thus leaving the majority of societal
maintenance to migrants. Without this work, societies would fail to operate.
How, then, is such a force of advancement reduced to such deep disregard as to be
presumed as stasis, as non-movement, when it is inherently positionally progressive? The social
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illusion of stasis brings up the overarching issue of usefulness, the same issue that de Beauvoir’s
serious man asks of minority groups. Following Nail’s proposal that migrants indeed drive social
change, it would be senseless to seriously question their usefulness. However, the idea of stasis
begs exploration. The imposition and continual perpetuation of the social illusion of stasis
creates an existence in silence for those who complete work that is deemed invaluable by a
collective of citizens, consisting of identities belonging to the majority, who are and perpetuate a
narrative of a national group. Migrants, being outside of the majority and national group, are
immediately thrown into an identity of uselessness, where their work is perceived to hold no
value. While some migrants (notably, not all) are permitted to exist within the bounds of a nation
state, their existence cannot be robust, as their value to society is determined by their
contributions of labor which are rendered invisible. Keeping in mind the many barriers to
becoming a member of a national community that migrants may face that have been discussed
throughout previous chapters, such as language, cultural difference, and ethnicity, one may come
to realize the inescapability of this identity of uselessness. Due to this inescapability, vast
numbers of migrants resort to jobs thought of by nationals as unproductive, and thus “useless”
jobs and the identity of migrant come to be closely associated with one another. If one’s
contribution to society is understood as stasis, it fails to be recognized for its true worth, and one
adopts the identity of the useless. In addition to this perception, many occupational avenues are
closed to migrants, perhaps due to a lack of an educational background or a language barrier.
Nail argues that to many citizens who themselves have never worked a maintenance job, that the
images of stasis and the migrant have become one and the same.
The spectrum of usefulness for residents of a nation-state, temporarily excluding stateless
refugees from the equation, begins with undocumented migrants and ends with those holding full
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citizenship. Though people of all immigration statuses may hold high-paying, high-powered
jobs, this is not statistically reflective of the general population. While many undocumented
migrants hold low-paying jobs, citizens hold high-paying jobs at drastically higher rates in
comparison, and this is the case due to a variety of political and economic factors. However, this
division is powerfully reflected in Said’s analysis of the Self and the Other in Orientalism. While
the citizen in a position of power and authority, in the context of the spectrum of usefulness,
adopts the place of the Self, the migrant who holds no economic, socio-political, or legal
authority adopts the place of the Other without choice. As the citizen belongs to the majority, the
collective and exclusive national community, the citizen is permitted to adjust the vantage point
of the general public, and to identify as the Self. In Chapter 2, I discussed the significance of
creating nationalized narratives of the Self, based on the vantage point of the public. If the Other
is everything that the Self is not, and the Self is proclaimed as useful, then the Other is not
useful, and forcibly adopts the collective identity of “useless.” The division between the Self and
the Other on the spectrum of usefulness is continuously reinforced by the social, political, legal,
and economic limitations that many migrants face when entering and remaining in the workforce
of a host nation-state. When it is ensured, through policy and social exclusion on the bases of
these barriers, that many migrants are never allowed the opportunity to join a national
community, the chasm between the Self and the Other is reinforced.
The division between the Self and the Other could also be seen as the reason why many
stateless refugees remain excluded from national communities and from the physical occupation
of states. As I discussed in Section A, the preservation of the existing majority national
community almost always comes before the needs (often desperate) of stateless refugees in the
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priorities of the nation-state as reflected in policy. Furthering a narrative of “us vs. them,” the
preservation of the Self as opposed to the accommodation of an Other is always prioritized.
The Self and the Other manifest quite interestingly in Simone de Beauvoir’s notions of
the serious man, in which the serious man himself is he who controls the vantage point of
determining what is and is not important, and what does and does not hold value. De Beauvoir
explains throughout The Ethics of Ambiguity that the serious man sacrifices the freedoms of
others in conflating his own subjectivity with the unconditional object. Convinced that his
ideations are universal the serious man is oblivious to the freedoms of others, always living as
though his own ambitions are all that exist. On the question of the useful, the serious man is
unable to discern that what may be useful to him is not universally applicable. Worse, the serious
man is uninterested and seemingly entirely unaware of any ideations held by others. De Beauvoir
explains,

“[The serious man] accords an absolute meaning to the epithet useful, which, in truth, has no more meaning
if taken by itself than the words high, low, right, and left. It simply designates a relationship and requires a
complement: useful for this or that. The complement itself must be put into question, and, as we shall see
later on, the whole problem of action is then raised.
But the serious man puts nothing into question. For the military man, the army is useful; for the
colonial administrator, the highway; for the serious revolutionary, the revolution--army, highway,
revolution, productions becoming inhuman idols to which one will not hesitate to sacrifice man himself.
Therefore, the serious man is dangerous. It is natural that he makes himself a tyrant. Dishonestly ignoring
the subjectivity of his choice, he pretends that the unconditioned value of the object is being asserted
through him; and by the same token he also ignores the value of the subjectivity and the freedom of others,
to such an extent that, sacrificing them to the thing, he persuades himself that what he sacrifices is nothing.
The colonial administrator who has raised the highway to the stature of an idol will have no scruple about
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assuring its construction at the price of a great number of lives of the natives; for, what value has the life of
a native who is incompetent, lazy, and clumsy when it comes to building highways?” 107

In this way, the colonialist creates a vantage point from a position of power and positions himself
as the Self and the indigenous man as the Other, while imposing that viewpoint, because of his
position of power, on the indigenous man. The idolization of the colonialist, the highway, is not a
universally-worshipped icon, but the colonialist is uninterested in and unable (because he has
convinced himself otherwise) to see another worldview. Unable to empathize or realize the
ontologies of the indigenous man, the colonialist sacrifices the freedoms of the Other in the name
of his invented universal truth.
Like the colonialist, the concept of usefulness becomes a complication of the opposition
between the Self and the Other when applied to stateless refugees in the context of the nationstate. There remains an idolization, analogous the colonialist, but the situation is more expansive,
as it is globalized. The idol is the national community, while the stateless refugee is a useless
asset, or even a potential threat, to the stability of that sacred assembly. In order to protect the
sanctity of the community, which is exclusive in terms of national identity, cultural practice, race
and ethnicity, and many other points of distinction, the nation must become impenetrable. With
unforgiving immigration policies reflecting the exclusivity of the national community, the
nation-state preserves itself, at the cost of the lives of those living outside the border. Appearing
to differ greatly from the members of a national community, through the lens of the nation the
stateless refugee has nothing of value to contribute to the preservation or progression of the

107

Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, (New York: Open Road Media, 2018), 49,
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bucknell/detail.action?docID=5375926.

89

nation-state, and thus remains condemned to live outside of a border, beyond the reach of
juridical protection of rights.
Returning to the arguments of Thomas Nail, there is undoubtedly a link between the
perception of stasis and the perception of stateless refugees as useless, as viewing progress as
“lacking” implies that said progress is contributing nothing to society. As Nail discusses, the
social illusion of stasis originates from the association of migrant workers with menial jobs, such
as maintenance jobs that, while contributing greatly to the overall functioning of a society, do not
hold the same social standing as white-collar work or jobs that require education or higher levels
of applied skills. This impression, though both incorrect and sweepingly discriminatory in
nature, creates the social illusion of stasis, or that this work actually contributes nothing at all to
the progression of society. Stateless refugees, who fall under the greater category of the term
“migrant” (which I defined specifically in Section A), are yet to reach the stage of working
within a nation-state like the migrants that Nail discusses, as they are still not permitted to enter.
However, stateless refugees still retain the identity of a “migrant” because of their inherent
movement across borders. Interestingly, the category of “migrant” holds no specifications on
one’s ethnic identity or national origin: it contains and refers only to one’s movement across an
international border, beginning always, and for stateless refugees, ending following the crossing
of the border of one’s home country, into unmarked territory or into another nation-state. While
some migrants fare well, usually white migrants originating from European countries, those who
face discriminatory social attitudes, like the social illusion of stasis, are usually migrants of
color. Some racial groups are stereotypically prized for their perceived usefulness, such as white
Europeans with bachelor’s degrees, or wealthy, educated East Asian immigrants, while other
racial groups, such as refugees of civil war from South Sudan or El Salvador, who often come
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with little educational background, receive rejection, racism and detention at the borders of the
United States specifically. Nail’s theory, specifying no nation in particular, can apply to the
experiences of many migrants globally, working within a range of countries that vary greatly in
culture. Therefore, stateless refugees, experiencing rejection on all sides as a result of a universal
stereotype, remain trapped in “no man’s land.” Unable to enter a new country, return to their
homelands, or escape the identity of “migrant,” stateless refugees are helplessly static.
The connection between the arguments of Simone de Beauvoir and Thomas Nail lies in
the projection of one’s worldview unforgivingly unto another. Both the serious man and the
society that projects the illusion of stasis onto the work of migrants share in their imposition of
their own ideations onto others, who, obliged to live with the real socio-political consequences of
these unsolicited convictions, remain in a state of real stasis, as the oppression of the majority is
inescapable. For stateless refugees, the arguments raised by Hannah Arendt in The Origins of
Totalitarianism ring eerily true: without the protection of rights that a nation-state provides, this
oppression is quite literally undeniable and relentless. When a majority group in a position of
power over a minority group perpetuates a specific narrative oppressing that minority, that
narrative will hold enormous socio-political weight, especially if that minority group has no
means of combatting that narrative.
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Conclusion

Currently there exists a dominating narrative about refugees and migrants that controls
political decisions about their legal statuses, social norms surrounding where in national
communities they are accepted, and immigration policies regarding their admittance into host
countries following their flight. These narratives originate from sources other than stateless
refugees themselves: from oppressive majority groups like exclusive national communities, and
from nation-states with juridical power over them. Throughout my thesis, I have discussed the
origins of these narratives, in addition to the repercussions that they have on the ability of
stateless refugees to find citizenships and legal residences, to live with defended rights, and to
integrate into national communities within states in order to benefit equally from their resident
state as other members of those communities. From the theories of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, I
have examined traditional conceptions of natural-born rights, and through the arguments of
Hannah Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism, determined that rights, in order to function
effectively as they are intended to, must be protected by a nation-state with the juridical capacity
to enforce them. With Arendt’s arguments, I have determined that the concept of inalienable
rights cannot function as intended to under the circumstances of a world of nation-states.
Affording rights to all people, on the basis of their existence or birth as people, does not function
in a world of nation-states that hold interests in protecting their own populations. The model of
inalienable rights does not account for the existences of stateless people, who live without
protected rights as they are forced to claim no affiliation to any nation-state.
With Arendt’s arguments in mind, I discussed the attitudes of individuals and populations
that lead to the exclusion of stateless refugees from national communities. Looking to Simone de
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Beauvoir’s text The Ethics of Ambiguity, I analyze her theory of the “serious man,” who
conflates his subjective worldview for the objective order of the universe. I analyzed the attitude
of the serious man, who is either unaware of or uninterested in the worldviews of others,
alongside the philosophical proposition of Edward Said of the Self and the Other. Delving into a
philosophical argument, I concluded that the attitudes of the Self and the Other, which places a
privileged vantage point of the Other in the hands of the Self, and of the serious man, which
prioritizes a privileged perspective of objective truth, are adopted by nation-states in their
treatment of stateless refugees seeking legal statuses in their jurisdiction.
Finally, I sought to connect Said’s and de Beauvoir’s arguments to the greater question of
the usefulness of the refugee that dominates national conversations about immigration policy. I
looked to Thomas Nail’s The Figure of the Migrant, in which he proposes a theory of social
stasis, in which occupational fields primarily upheld by migrants were considered to be useless
by portions of populations. Seeing migrant work as useless is an attitude that contributes to the
continued oppression of stateless refugees, as they are perceived to have nothing to contribute to
any given nation-state even before they are permitted entry. Ultimately, the perspectives of the
serious man and the Self, who prioritize their own worldviews and even see them as objective,
do not see stateless refugees as useful. It is when the nation-state adopts the attitudes of the
serious man and the Self that the struggle of the stateless refugee persists, as immigration
policies are formed from these attitudes.
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